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INTRODUCTION   
Imagine that the government had the power to compel individuals to 
reveal a vast amount of personal information about themselves—where 
they live, their phone numbers, their physical description, their photo-
graph, their age, their medical problems, all of their legal transgressions 
throughout their lifetimes whether serious crimes or minor infractions, 
the names of their parents, children, and spouses, their political party af-
filiations, where they work and what they do, the property that they own 
and its value, and sometimes even their psychotherapists’ notes, doctors’ 
records, and financial information. 
Then imagine that the government routinely poured this information 
into the public domain—by posting it on the Internet where it could be 
accessed from all over the world, by giving it away to any individual or 
company that asked for it,  or even by providing entire databases of per-
sonal information upon request. In an increasingly “wired” society, with 
technology such as sophisticated computers to store, transfer, search, and 
sort through all this information, imagine the way that the information 
could be combined or used to obtain even more personal information. 
Imagine the ease with which this information could fall into the 
hands of crafty criminals, identity thieves, stalkers, and others who could 
use the information to threaten or intimidate individuals.  Imagine also 
that this information would be available to those who make important de-
cisions about an individual’s life and career—such as whether the indi-
vidual will get a loan or a job.  Also imagine that in many cases, the indi-
vidual might not be able to explain any concerns raised by this 
information or even know that such information was used in making 
these decisions. 
Imagine as well that this information would be traded among hun-
dreds of private-sector companies that would combine it with a host of 
other information such as one’s hobbies, purchases, magazines, organiza-
tions, credit history, and so on.  This expanded profile would then be sold 
back to the government in order to investigate and monitor individuals 
more efficiently. 
Stop imagining.  What I described is what is currently beginning to 
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occur throughout the United States by the use of federal, state, and local 
public records, and the threat posed to privacy by public records is rap-
idly becoming worse. 
For decades, federal, state, and local governments have been keep-
ing records about their citizens.  States maintain records spanning an in-
dividual’s life from birth to death, including records of births, marriages, 
divorces, professional licenses, voting information, worker’s compensa-
tion, personnel files (for public employees), property ownership, arrests, 
victims of crime, criminal and civil court proceedings, and scores of 
other information.  Federal agencies maintain records pertaining to im-
migration, bankruptcy, social security, military personnel, and so on.  
These records contain personal information including a person’s physical 
description (age, photograph, height, weight, eye color); race, nationality, 
and gender; family life (children, marital history, divorces, and even in-
timate details about one’s marital relationship); residence, location, and 
contact information (address, telephone number, value and type of prop-
erty owned, description of one’s home); political activity (political party 
affiliation, contributions to political groups,  frequency of voting); finan-
cial condition (bankruptcies, financial information, salary, debts); em-
ployment (place of employment, job position, salary, sick leave); crimi-
nal history (arrests, convictions, traffic citations); health and medical 
condition (doctors’ reports, psychiatrists’ notes, drug prescriptions, dis-
eases and other disorders); and identifying information (mother’s maiden 
name, Social Security number).  This list is far from complete.  Many of 
these records are open for public inspection. 
Until recently, public records were difficult to access. For a long 
time, public records were only available locally.  Finding information 
about a person often involved a treasure hunt around the country to a se-
ries of local offices to dig up records.  But with the Internet revolution, 
public records can be easily obtained and searched from anywhere. Once 
scattered about the country, now public records are consolidated by pri-
vate sector entities into gigantic databases.  Recently, the federal court 
system has proposed to make court records available electronically, 
sparking a considerable debate over privacy because highly sensitive in-
formation such as one’s Social Security number, medical and psycho-
logical records, financial information, and even details about one’s mari-
tal relationship are sometimes lodged in court records. 
A complicated web of state and federal regulation governs the ac-
cessibility of these records.  This regulation was formulated to balance 
two important, yet sometimes conflicting, interests.  One of these inter-
ests is transparency, the need to expose government bureaucracy to pub-
lic scrutiny.  The Federal Freedom of Information Act is an attempt to 
promote such transparency.  Access to court records, in the words of Jus-
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tice Holmes, ensures “that those who administer justice should always act 
under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be 
able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public 
duty is performed.”1 
The other interest is privacy.  Increasingly, as more personal infor-
mation is collected, stored, and consolidated in government databases, 
the threat to privacy is imminent.  Federal, state, and local governments 
have been one of the principal suppliers of personal information to the 
private sector. A growing number of large corporations are assembling 
dossiers on practically every individual by combining information in 
public records with information collected in the private sector such as 
one’s purchases, spending habits, magazine subscriptions, web surfing 
activity, and credit history.  Increasingly, these dossiers of fortified pub-
lic record information are sold back to government agencies for use in 
investigating people. 
In this Article, I argue that the regulation of public records in the 
United States must be rethought in light of the new technologies in the 
Information Age, and I advance a theory about how to reconcile the ten-
sion between transparency and privacy. 
First, I contend that information privacy must be reconceptualized in 
the context of public records to abandon the longstanding notion that 
there is no claim to privacy when information appears in a public record.  
This view, which I term the “secrecy paradigm,” understands privacy as 
depending upon whether information is secret or non-secret.  The secrecy 
paradigm fails to account for the realities of the Information Age, where 
information is rarely completely confidential.  I suggest that privacy must 
be understood as an expectation of a limit on the degree of accessibility 
of information. 
Second, I critique the widespread view that one has a privacy inter-
est only in information that is embarrassing or harmful to one’s reputa-
tion.  Much of the personal information contained in public records (i.e., 
one’s race, marital status, party affiliation, property values, and so on) is 
relatively innocuous.  However, as I explain, it is the totality of the in-
formation, aggregated together, that presents the problem.  Consolidating 
various bits of information, each in itself relatively unrevealing, can, in 
the aggregate, begin to paint a portrait of a person’s life.  I refer to this as 
a “digital biography.”  A growing number of private sector organizations 
are using public records to construct digital biographies on millions of 
individuals.  I argue that we should be concerned about the ways in 
which our digital biographies are being used.  These uses are resulting in 
a growing dehumanization, powerlessness, and vulnerability for indi-
 1. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). 
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viduals.  Therefore, viewed in light of my theory of information privacy, 
the regulation of public record regimes must be substantially rethought. 
I contend that the appropriate balance between transparency and 
privacy can be reached by limiting access and uses of certain information 
rather then making public records unavailable to the public.  If the se-
crecy paradigm is abandoned and privacy is understood as an expectation 
in the limitation of the degree of accessibility of information, then com-
mercial access and use restrictions as well as a federal baseline of regula-
tion for all public records would help significantly in addressing the 
problem. 
A potential hurdle to the adoption of these solutions is the First 
Amendment.  Although the First Amendment establishes a right to access 
certain court proceedings and records, I contend that this right does not 
and should not extend to other types of public records.  In fact, based 
upon developing strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Constitu-
tion imposes certain limitations and responsibilities on the government’s 
collection and use of personal information. 
Next, I analyze the implications of such a solution for the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech and the press.  This issue 
is quite complicated, as there is a significant tension between two lines of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  One line of cases holds that when the 
government makes information publicly available in a public record, the 
press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.2  Another line of cases, 
however, establishes that the government may selectively grant access to 
public record information and suggests that the government may condi-
tion the receipt of such information on nondisclosure.3  In an extensive 
navigation of these potentially conflicting precedents, I conclude that ac-
cess and use restrictions of public record information will generally not 
run afoul of the First Amendment. 
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to the history of public 
records and how these records are regulated. Part II describes how pri-
vacy in this context should be reconceptualized, taking into account the 
problems of access and aggregation. Part III examines the  constitutional 
issues. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC RECORDS   
From the beginning of the twentieth century, we have witnessed a 
 2. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn 
Publ’g Co., 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 3. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 
32 (1999); cf.  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (finding that prohibiting abortion 
counseling or referral as a condition for receipt of Title X funds does not violate the First 
Amendment). 
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vast proliferation in the number of government records kept about indi-
viduals as well as a significant increase in public access to these records.  
These trends together have created a problematic state of affairs—a sys-
tem where the government extracts personal information from the popu-
lace and places it in the public domain, where it is hoarded by private 
sector corporations that assemble dossiers on almost every American 
citizen.  In this Part, I will explore public record systems, examining the 
types of public records maintained by governments and the regulatory 
regime that governs access to these records.  This regulatory regime has 
not adequately matured to respond to the realities of modern information 
flow. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC RECORD-KEEPING 
1. Federal, State, and Local Public Records 
Public record-keeping is largely a product of the twentieth century.  
Before the mid-nineteenth century, few public records were collected, 
and most of them were kept at a very local level.4  During the late nine-
teenth century and early twentieth century, state and local governments 
increasingly began to keep records of their citizens.5  In the 1940s, 50s, 
and 60s, the expansion of the bureaucratic network of regulation, licens-
ing, and entitlements at the federal, state, and local levels resulted in a 
massive escalation of public records.6 
Today, a welter of public records is kept by federal, state, and local 
governmental entities. States maintain a smorgasbord of public records, 
covering one’s life from birth to death.7  Birth records can contain one’s 
name, date of birth, place of birth, full names and ages of one’s parents, 
and mother’s maiden name.8  In particular, a person’s mother’s maiden 
name is an important piece of information because many financial insti-
tutions and other entities use it as a password to access more sensitive 
data.  Shortly after birth, the federal government stamps an individual 
 4. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY 
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 12 (2000). 
 5. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1892, 1906-07 (1981). 
 6. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE 73 
(Tim May ed., 2001); ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE 
SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY 220-23 (1972).  For a discussion 
of the expansion of government entitlements and licensing, see Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-37 (1964). 
 7. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors 
for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (2001).  
 8. See, e.g.,  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102425(a)(1)-(11) (West Supp. 
2002). 
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with a Social Security number, which will be used throughout her life to 
identify her and consolidate records about her.9  States also maintain 
other records relating to one’s personal life, such as records about one’s 
marriage, divorce, and death.  These records are often referred to collec-
tively as “vital records.” Records of marriages, which are public in most 
states,10 contain maiden name, the date and place of birth of both 
spouses, as well as their residential addresses.11 
Beyond vital records, states keep records for almost every occasion 
an individual comes into contact with the state bureaucracy.  When a per-
son obtains a license to drive, the state records and publicizes informa-
tion such as her name, address, phone number, Social Security number, 
medical information, height, weight, gender, eye color, photograph, and 
date of birth.12  Additionally, accident reports and traffic citation records 
are made publicly available by many states. 
Individuals who register to vote must surrender information into a 
public record.  Voting records can reveal one’s political party affiliation, 
date of birth, place of birth, e-mail address, home address, telephone 
number,13 and sometimes one’s Social Security number.14 In many 
states, this information is publicly available.15   
One’s profession and employment often generate a number of re-
cords.  A number of professions require state licensing, such as doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, insurance agents, nurses, police, accountants, and 
teachers.16  If an individual is injured at work, worker’s compensation 
records may disclose one’s date of birth, type of injury, and Social Secu-
rity number.17  If a person is a public employee, many personal details 
 9. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1402. 
 10. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103150 (West 1996). 
 11. See, e.g., id. § 103175 (West Supp. 2002). 
 12. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AND 
FINANCIAL FRAUD 6 n.5 (March 1997), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/privacy.pdf; see also Joan Bisk-
upic, High Court to Hear Driver Privacy Case, WASH. POST, May 18, 1999, at A8. 
 13. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2102, 2150(a)(1)-(10) (West Supp. 2002); CAROLE A. 
LANE, NAKED IN CYBERSPACE: HOW TO FIND PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLINE 274 
(1997).  
 14. EDMUND J. PANKAU, CHECK IT OUT! 16 (1998). 
 15. Some states are beginning to restrict access to voter records for certain purposes, 
although the permissible purposes remain quite broad.  In California, for example, voter 
records are openly available to any political candidate, to any committee for or against any 
initiative or referendum, and “to any person for election, scholarly, journalistic, or political 
purposes.” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2194 (West Supp. 2002).  Therefore, any person or entity 
with even a tangential relationship to the political process can obtain this information. 
 16. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1403. 
 17. See LANE, supra note 13, at 275.  Seven states make workers’ compensation re-
cords publicly accessible.  See PUBLIC RECORDS ONLINE: THE NATIONAL GUIDE TO 
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are released to the public by way of personnel records, including one’s 
home address, phone number, Social Security number, salary, sick leave, 
and sometimes even e-mail messages.18  In Massachusetts, government 
officials are required by law to maintain “street lists” containing the 
names, addresses, dates of birth, veteran statuses, nationalities, and occu-
pations of all residents.19  These lists, which organize residents by the 
streets they live on, are made available to the police,20 to all political 
committees and candidates, and to businesses and other organizations.21 
One’s home and property are also a matter of public record.  Prop-
erty tax assessment records contain a detailed description of one’s home, 
including number of bedrooms and bathrooms, amenities such as swim-
ming pools, the size of the house, and the value.22  These records are 
public.23  Other property ownership records unveil lifestyle information 
such as whether one owns a boat, and if so, its size and type.24 
Often, any contact with law enforcement officials will yield a re-
cord.  Arrest records can contain one’s name, occupation, physical de-
scription, date of birth, and the asserted factual circumstances surround-
ing the arrest.25 Police records also contain information about victims of 
crime. 
Court records are potentially the most revealing records about indi-
viduals. Whenever a person comes into contact with the judicial system, 
information is released into a public record.  In almost all states, court 
records are presumed to be public.26  Although current practice and exist-
PRIVATE & GOVERNMENT ONLINE SOURCES OF PUBLIC RECORDS 21 (Michael L. Sankey 
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001). 
 18. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4(b)(8)(A)-(C) (Michie 2001) (first version) 
(requiring disclosure of particular information in public employees’ personnel records in-
cluding salary, education, prior work experience, and any disciplinary troubles); Braun v. 
City of Taft, 201 Cal. Rptr. 654, 660-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (permitting disclosure of an 
employee’s Social Security number, home address, and birth date); Eskaton Monterey 
Hosp. v. Myers, 184 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (permitting disclosure of a 
state employee’s personnel file, which contained education and training experience); Moak 
v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 336 A.2d 920, 921, 924 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (permitting 
disclosure of payroll records that contained employees’ names, gender, date of birth, an-
nual salary, and other personal data).  But see IDAHO CODE § 9-340C(1) (Michie Supp. 
2001) (exempting personnel records from public disclosure). 
 19. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, § 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  § 6; see also Pottle v. Sch Comm. of Braintree, 482 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 
1985). 
 22. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408.3 (West 1998). 
 23. See id.  § 408.3(a) (“Property characteristics information maintained by the as-
sessor is a public record and shall be open to public inspection.”). 
 24. See LANE, supra note 13, at 274-75. 
 25. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(1) (West Supp. 2002). 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17; see, e.g., CAL. R. 243.1(c) (“Unless 
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ing physical constraints limit the extent to which personal information in 
court documents can be accessed, new technologies are on the verge of 
changing this reality.27 
In civil cases, such as suits for personal injury, medical malpractice, 
product liability, and so on, court files may contain vast quantities of 
data, such as medical history, mental health data, tax returns, and other 
financial information.28  For example, in an ordinary civil lawsuit over an 
automobile accident, the plaintiff must submit medical information, in-
cluding any pre-existing conditions that might affect her recovery or be 
responsible for her symptoms.  This data could even include psychologi-
cal information.  To establish damages, the plaintiff must also reveal de-
tails about her lifestyle, activities, and employment.  If this information is 
contained in a document filed with the court or is mentioned in a hearing 
or at trial, it can potentially become accessible to the public unless pro-
tected by a protective order.  In addition to plaintiffs, civil defendants 
must also yield personal information in many instances. 
Witnesses and other third parties who are involved in cases can have 
deeply personal details snared by discovery and later exposed in court 
documents.  If a person serves as a juror, her name, address, spouse’s 
name, occupation, place of employment, and answers to voir dire ques-
tions may become part of the court record.29 Additionally, some courts 
have held that the public may have access to questionnaires given to ju-
rors as part of voir dire.30  Voir dire questions can involve sensitive mat-
ters such as whether a juror was the victim of a crime, the juror’s political 
and religious beliefs, any medical and psychological conditions that 
confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.”). Not all court 
records are public; in most states, adoption records, grand jury records, and juvenile crimi-
nal court records are not public. See, e.g., David S. Jackson, Privacy and Ohio’s Public 
Records Act, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 107, 120 (1997); see also The Federal Judiciary, Fre-
quently Asked Questions, Filing a Case, Q: How Can I Check on the Status of My Case?  
Can I Review Case Files?, at http:/www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited June 29, 2002).  
Beyond pleadings and motions (which are, for the most part, always contained in the court 
file), other documents (such as exhibits) and transcripts may or may not be contained in 
the file.  For example, typically a trial transcript will only be contained in the court file if 
an appeal is taken.  The availability of other documents, such as exhibits, in the court file 
is controlled by local practice.  Local practices vary greatly depending on limited storage 
capacities in clerks’ offices.  Often, exhibits are kept by the parties. 
 27. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 28. LANE, supra note 13, at 246. 
 29. See, e.g., Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court, 183 F.3d 
949, 950 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1358-59 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(noting that a public right of access to voir dire proceedings exists); People v. Mitchell, 
592 N.W.2d 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the press has a “qualified right of 
access” to jurors’ names and addresses). 
 30. Lesher Communications, Inc. v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. Rptr. 154, 156-57 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990). 
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might affect the juror’s performance, and other private details.31 
Beyond ordinary civil lawsuits, special civil proceedings such as 
appeals from the denial of social security benefits release much informa-
tion into court records, such as a person’s disability, work performance, 
Social Security number, birth date, address, phone number, and medical 
records.32  In federal bankruptcy courts, any “paper filed . . . and the 
dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination 
by an entity at reasonable times without charge.”33  Information involved 
in bankruptcy proceedings includes one’s Social Security number, ac-
count numbers, employment data, sources of income, expenses, debts 
owed, and other financial information.34  Additionally, in certain circum-
stances, employees of a company that declares bankruptcy can have their 
personal information divulged in public bankruptcy records.35 
In some states, family court proceedings are public.  For example, a 
divorce proceeding can unmask the intimacies of marital relationships. 
As one state court held, “[a] private citizen seeking a divorce in this State 
must unavoidably do so in a public forum, and consequently many pri-
vate family and marital matters become public.”36 
For criminal cases, there is even less privacy.  Beyond the personal 
details about a defendant released at trial or in the government’s indict-
ment or charging papers, conviction records are made public.37  Informa-
tion about victims—their lifestyles, medical data, and occupation—can 
also be found in court records.  Presentence reports prepared by proba-
tion officers about convicted defendants facing sentence are used by 
judges in arriving at the appropriate sentence.  These reports contain 
identifying information about the defendant, a summary of the defen-
 31. In practice, juror information is rarely sought out except in high profile cases. 
 32. A person may appeal from the denial of social security benefits pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 405(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Dec. 21, 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-90, 115 Stat. 878.  If social security information is disclosed in court filings, confiden-
tiality is lost.  20 C.F.R. § 401.180 (2001). 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2000). 
 34. Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bankruptcy 
Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1011, 1020 (2000). 
 35. See Jerry Markon, Curbs Debated As Court Records Go Public on Net, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at B1.  Normally, bankruptcy filings only include personal informa-
tion about a company’s top officials.  However, an Internet furniture retailer included in-
formation in its bankruptcy petition about all employees “to blunt criticism from creditors 
that it had recklessly burned through cash.”  Id.  At the request of creditors, a court-
appointed trustee posted the information on the retailer’s website.  Id. 
 36. In re Keene Sentinel, 612 A.2d 911, 915-16 (N.H. 1992); see also Barron v. Fla. 
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 119 (Fla. 1988) (“[P]arties seeking a dissolu-
tion of their marriage are not entitled to a private court proceeding just because they are 
required to utilize the judicial system.”). 
 37. See LANE, supra note 13, at 213. 
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dant’s prior criminal conduct, social history, character, family environ-
ment, education, employment and income, and medical and psychologi-
cal information.38  Although in many states and in federal court, presen-
tence reports remain confidential, in some states, such as California, the 
presentence report becomes part of the court file after sentencing.39 
Community notification laws for sex offenders, often referred to as 
“Megan’s Laws,” require the maintenance of databases of information 
about prior sex offenders and disclosure of their identities and where they 
live.40 In 1996, Congress passed a federal Megan’s Law restricting states 
from receiving federal anti-crime funds unless they agree to “release 
relevant information that is necessary to protect the public” from released 
sex offenders.41  As a result, all fifty states enacted some version of Me-
gan’s Law.42  Sex offender records often contain the sex offender’s So-
cial Security number, photograph, address, prior convictions, and places 
of employment.43  Some states have placed their sex offender records on 
the Internet.44  Several states fail to identify the particular crime the of-
fenders are charged with, lumping all of them under the label sex of-
fender, even where some might be rapists while others could be listed for 
sodomy, public masturbation, or indecent exposure.45 
In a move broader than Megan’s Law, some localities are widely 
disseminating records about individuals arrested, but not yet convicted, 
of certain crimes.  For example, in 1997 Kansas City initiated “John TV,” 
broadcasting on a government-owned television station the names, pho-
tographs, addresses, and ages of people who had merely been arrested 
(not convicted) for soliciting prostitutes.46 Other cities have initiated 
 38. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.10 (West 1982); CAL. CT. R. 4.411.5(a)(6). 
 39. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203d (West Supp. 2002) (“The report shall be 
filed with the clerk of the court as a record in the case at the time the court considers the 
report.”). 
 40. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that New Jer-
sey’s Megan’s Law does not violate the constitutional right to information privacy because 
of compelling governmental interest in preventing sex offenses); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 
F.3d 1079, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Washington’s Megan’s Law does not 
violate the constitutional right to information privacy because the information compiled 
and disclosed is already public). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Oct. 28, 
2000, 42 U.S.C.S.  § 14071 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001). 
 42. Jane A. Small, Who Are the People In Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public 
Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451, 1459 (1999). 
 43. See, e.g. Paul P., 170 F.3d at 398; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. 
 44. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, Sexual Offenders/Predators Search 
System, at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Sexual_Predators (last visited March 12, 2002) ; 
N.C. State Bureau of Investigation, North Carolina Sex Offender & Public Protection Reg-
istry, at http://sbi.jus.state.nc.us/sor/ MainText.htm (1998). 
 45. See Small, supra note 42, at 1456, 1463-64.  
 46. Edward Walsh, Kansas City Tunes In as New Program Aims at Sex Trade: ‘John 
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similar programs.47  Additionally, a growing number of states are fur-
nishing online databases of all of their current inmates and parolees.48 
2. The Government-Madison Avenue Connection 
For a long time, private sector companies have relied upon public 
records to obtain personal information about individuals for marketing 
purposes.  In the burgeoning Information Age, marketing thrives upon 
personal information, giving rise to an entire industry devoted to the col-
lection of personal information. I have discussed the history and current 
collection and use of personal information by the private sector in more 
detail elsewhere.49 
Much of the information collected by the private sector comes from 
public records and personal information held by the government. For ex-
ample, beginning in the nineteenth century, advertisers began using cen-
sus data as a marketing device.50  In 1970, the United States began sell-
ing its census data on magnetic tapes.51  Often at the behest of marketers, 
the Census Bureau increasingly sought data about people’s lifestyles.  To 
do this, the Census Bureau required a subset of households to fill out a 
long questionnaire asking dozens of questions.52  These questions in-
cluded such information as how much rent people pay, what products 
they own, their occupation, their marital history, and their income.53 The 
connection between the Census Bureau and marketers has been a very 
close one.  Presidents have frequently appointed former marketers to 
serve as the head of the Census Bureau.54  In 1981, a group of ten com-
panies made a pact with the Census Bureau for it to undertake a special 
TV,’ WASH. POST, July 8, 1997, at A3. 
 47.  Id. 
 48. D. Ian Hopper, Database, Protection, Or a Kind of Prison?: Web Registries of 
Inmates, Parolees Prompt a Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2000, at A31. 
 49. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1403-09. 
 50. ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER: HOW OUR PRIVATE LIVES BECOME 
PUBLIC COMMODITIES 30-31 (1992). 
 51. See DICK SHAVER, THE NEXT STEP IN DATABASE MARKETING 29 (1996); see 
also LARSON, supra note 50, at 41. 
 52. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER 270 (2d 
ed. 1996); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 127 (1971). 
 53. See MILLER, supra note 52, at 127.  The 2000 Census long form asks for infor-
mation on sex, age, race, education, employment, income, value and physical description 
of residence, vehicles owned, as well as other information.  See U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
Long Form Questionnaire (Form D-2)  available at 
www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/do2p.pdf (approved for use by the public through Dec. 
31, 2000). 
 54. Since the 1970s, the Census Bureau has been run by a former director of market-
ing at General Motors, an executive at a political polling firm, a research manager for 
Sears, and a past president of the American Marketing Association.  LARSON,  supra note 
50, at 44. 
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tabulation of census data by zip code—with the companies enjoying ex-
clusive access to the results.55  The questions asked by the census are of-
ten quite helpful to marketers and the Census Bureau has been accused of 
being too influenced by the needs and wants of corporate America.56 
For decades, many states have been selling their public records to 
the highest bidder.57  Colorado used to sell its motor vehicle information 
for about $4.4 million a year.58  Florida offered to sell copies of its motor 
vehicle information for $33 million.59  New York earned $17 million in 
one year from such sales.60 In 1994, the Federal Government, alarmed at 
this practice, passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, restricting such 
disclosures of information from motor vehicle records.61 
Increasingly, there is a two-way information flow between the pri-
vate and public sectors.  In other words, not only is the government sup-
plying information to the private sector, but the private sector is assisting 
the government in generating information about individuals.  Currently, 
government agencies such as the FBI and IRS are purchasing public re-
cord collections aggregated by private sector companies and combined 
with other data gathered by the private companies.62  A private company 
called ChoicePoint, Inc. has amassed a database of ten billion records and 
has contracts with at least thirty-five federal agencies to share the data 
with them.63  In 2000, the Justice Department signed an $8 million con-
tract with ChoicePoint, and the IRS reached a deal with the company for 
between $8 and $12 million.64  ChoicePoint collects information from 
public records from around the country and then combines it with infor-
mation from private detectives, the media, and credit reporting firms.65  
This data is indexed by people’s Social Security numbers.66  The Health 
Care Financing Administration (now the Center for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services) uses ChoicePoint’s data to help it identify fraudulent 
 55. Id. at 44-45. 
 56. Id. at 44-46. 
 57. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Governments Find Information Pays, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 9, 1998, at A1. 
 58. Robert Kowalski, Privacy Bills Up Next: Should Sale of Driver’s License Info 
Continue?, DENVER POST, May 5, 1997, at 1A. 
 59. Larry Rohter, Florida Weighs Fees for its Computer Data: Some See Profits; 
Others, Too High a Price, N.Y. TIMES NAT’L, Mar. 31, 1994, at B9. 
 60. See Biskupic, supra note 12, at A8.  Wisconsin receives $8 million annually from 
the sale of motor vehicle data.  See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000). 
 62. See Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get The Goods 
on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 1150 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:1137 
 
 
Medicare claims by checking health care provider addresses against 
ChoicePoint’s list of “high-risk and fraudulent business addresses.”67  
ChoicePoint claims that it has records on almost everybody with a credit 
card.68 
ChoicePoint’s information is not only used by government agencies 
but also by private sector employers to screen new hires or investigate 
existing employees.69  The information in ChoicePoint’s collection is a 
mixture of fact and fiction.70  There are a number of errors in the re-
cords.71  Richard Smith of the Privacy Foundation obtained his report 
and discovered numerous errors, including the false facts that he had 
been previously married and that his wife had a son three years before 
they met.72  A ChoicePoint report also erroneously indicated that a 
woman was a convicted drug dealer and shoplifter, resulting in the termi-
nation of her employment.73  ChoicePoint also had a hand in the 2000 
Presidential Election problems in Florida.  ChoicePoint supplied Florida 
officials with a list of 8000 “ex-felons” to eliminate from their voter 
lists.74  However, many of the 8000 were not guilty of felonies, only 
misdemeanors, and were legally eligible to vote.75  Although the error 
was discovered prior to the election and officials tried to place the indi-
viduals back on the voter rolls, the error might have led to some eligible 
voters being turned away at the polls.76 
3. The Impact of Technology 
For a long time, public records have been accessible only in the 
various localities in which they were kept.  A person or entity desiring to 
find out about the value of an individual’s home would have to travel to 
the town or county where the property was located and search through 
the records at the local courthouse.  Depending upon local practice, the 
seeker of a record might be able to obtain a copy through the mail.  Court 
records, such as bankruptcy records, would typically be obtained by visit-
ing a courthouse or engaging in a lengthy correspondence with the 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Richard Smith, My FBI File, at http://www.privacyfoundation.org/ commen-
tary/tipsheet.asp (May 11, 2001). 
 73. See Simpson, supra note 62, at A1. 
 74. See Gregory Palast, Florida’s Flawed “Voter-Cleansing” Program, Salon.com, 
at http://www.salonmag.com/politics/feature/2000/12/04/voter_file/ index.html (Dec. 4, 
2000). 
 75. Id.  
 76. See id.  
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clerk’s office.77  The seeker of a record could not obtain records en 
masse; records could only be obtained for specific individuals. 
This reality, however, is rapidly changing.  As records are increas-
ingly computerized, entire record systems rather than individual records 
can be easily searched, copied, and transferred.  Private sector organiza-
tions sweep up millions of records from record systems throughout the 
country and consolidate those records into gigantic record systems.  
Many websites now compile public records from across the country.78  
There are more than 165 companies offering public record information 
over the Internet.79 These companies have constructed gigantic databases 
of public records that were once dispersed throughout different agencies, 
offices, and courthouses, and with the click of a mouse, millions of re-
cords can be scoured for details.80 
 The increasing digitization of documents and the use of electronic 
filing will soon result in much greater accessibility to court records on-
line. A recent proposal to make court records electronic and available 
over the Internet has garnered significant attention. A majority of courts 
post only court rulings and schedules on their websites.  Only a handful 
of courts now post complaints and other legal documents.81  A few states 
have begun to require electronic copies of records to be filed or to con-
vert existing records into electronic format.  For example, in New Jersey, 
bankruptcy records (including a debtor’s bankruptcy petition) are 
scanned into electronic format and can be accessed through the Inter-
net.82 Some companies are beginning to make digital images of records 
available over the Internet.83 
Recently, the federal court system announced plans to develop a 
system for placing court filings online.  The existing system, called 
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records), includes only basic 
docketing information such as the names of the parties, attorneys, general 
type of action, and a list of documents filed.  The system under develop-
 77. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 34, at 1012. 
 78. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in 
the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1156-57 (1997). 
 79. See PUBLIC RECORDS ONLINE, supra note 17, at 8. 
 80. For example, KnowX.com states that it has amassed millions of public records, 
which are updated regularly.  See http://www.knowx.com (last visited June 29, 2002).  
Search Systems contains over 6000 searchable public record databases. See 
http://www.pac-info.com (last visited June 29, 2002).  Locateme.com permits its users to 
search public records such as driver registrations, voter registrations, and credit headers.  
See http://www.locateme.com (last visited June 29, 2002). 
 81. See Joanna Glasner, Courts Face Privacy Conundrum, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 26, 
2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41967,00.html. 
 82. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Dist. of N.J., Case Information, at  
http://www.njb.uscourts.gov/caseinfo/ (last visited March 12, 2002). 
 83. See http://www.courthousedirect.com (last visited June 29, 2002). 
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ment, called Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”), is 
designed to be in place by 2005.84  The system will make full case files 
accessible via the Internet.85  Currently, nine courts use the CM/ECF sys-
tem.86  Anybody is permitted to view, print, and download any document 
filed in the system.  The courts, however, have not developed compre-
hensive policies to deal with privacy concerns.87 
Beyond greater accessibility, technology may also lead to the reten-
tion of greater amounts of personal information in public records.  Under 
current practice, due to storage space constraints, clerks’ offices often do 
not maintain copies of exhibits and other documents related to trials.  
However, as court documents such as pleadings and exhibits are filed in 
digital format, they will become easier to store.  Further, under current 
practice, transcripts are typically produced only when a case is appealed. 
New technology enables transcripts of court proceedings to be made in-
stantaneously without having to be transcribed.  The increased use of 
such technology could result in the existence of more transcripts of trials, 
which can potentially include personal information about many parties 
and witnesses. 
In sum, the increasing digitization of documents enables more 
documents to be retained by eliminating storage constraints, increases the 
ability to access and copy documents, and permits the transfer of docu-
ments en masse.  Personal information in public records, once protected 
by the practical difficulties of gaining access to the records, is increas-
ingly less obscure. 
B. THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS 
As it currently stands, public records law is a complicated and di-
verse hodge-podge of various statutes, court practices, and common law 
rights that vary from state to state and leave much personal information 
unprotected.  Our information regulatory infrastructure is disconnected, 
often outdated, and inadequate to meet the challenges of the new tech-
nologies of the Information Age.  This section provides a brief overview 
of the law that governs public records. 
 84. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, at 
http://privacy.uscourts.gov/Press.htm (Feb. 16, 2001). 
 85. See Brian Krebs, Public Hearing Over Online Court Documents Planned, 
NEWSBYTES, Feb. 20, 2001, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/ 01/162183.html. 
 86. See Office of Judges Programs of the Admin. Office of the United States Courts, 
Privacy and Access to Electronic Case Files in the Federal Courts at 6, at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/privacyn.htm (Dec. 15, 1999). 
 87. Id.  
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1. The Common Law, Court Records, and Protective Orders 
At common law, English courts rarely encountered cases involving 
an individual seeking to gain access to government documents.88  In cer-
tain limited circumstances, English courts recognized that the public 
could inspect certain government records.89  If an individual were denied 
the ability to inspect, she could seek to enforce her right through manda-
mus; however, there were severe restrictions on the ability to use man-
damus to obtain access to records.  Individuals could not bring manda-
mus on their own and had no right to access government documents for 
their own personal purposes.90  There was a narrow exception to this 
rule, however, when the seeker of a record needed to obtain it for use in 
litigation.  Courts would generally “not issue the extraordinary writ of 
mandamus to enforce a private right of inspection, unless the purpose 
was to use it in some pending or prospective suit.”91  In contrast, access 
to court records, as opposed to other public records, was broader.  When 
documents were introduced into evidence, individuals were permitted ac-
cess.92 
Early U.S. courts followed the English practice.93  In many jurisdic-
tions, an individual seeking to inspect non-court records for the general 
public interest (to expose graft or corruption, or to bring government ac-
tivities into the sunlight), could not bring suit in her own name; only the 
Attorney General could bring an action on her behalf.94  However, if the 
person had a “special interest” in examining the records (for example, to 
provide evidence in a legal proceeding), the individual could bring a peti-
tion for mandamus on her own.95 As one court articulated the rule in 
1882,  
The individual demanding access to, and inspection of public writings must not 
only have an interest in the matters to which they relate, a direct, tangible inter-
est, but the inspection must be sought for some specific and legitimate pur-
pose.96 
 88. See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 25 (1953). 
 89. See, e.g., Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51 (Mich. 1928).  See generally 
William Ollie Key, Jr.,  The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In 
Camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659 (1982). 
 90. Nowack, 219 N.W. at 750-51. 
 91. Id. at  751.   
 92. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 135; Key, supra note 89, at 666. 
 93. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 26. 
 94. Nowack, 219 N.W. at 751. 
 95. See id. at 751; CROSS, supra note 88, at 25-26; Comment, Public Inspection of 
State and Municipal Documents: “Everybody, Practically Everything, Anytime, Ex-
cept . . . .”, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1977). 
 96. Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 305 (1882).  Some jurisdictions, such as Michi-
gan and Rhode Island, recognized a broader right to access than the English rule early on.  
See Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889); In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 
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In several jurisdictions, the common law evolved to abandon the 
view that access to documents was limited only to litigation purposes.97  
The “interest” required for inspection was expanded to include the inter-
est in redressing public wrongs and monitoring government functions.98  
Under the modern common law rule in many jurisdictions, a person can 
inspect public records when the purpose is not improper and access is not 
harmful to others.99 One of the most commonly mentioned improper pur-
poses for accessing public records was “to satisfy idle curiosity or for the 
purpose of creating a public scandal.”100  Therefore, government officials 
could deny access to information based on the person’s reason for seek-
ing the information.101  Today, however, this discretion has been signifi-
cantly reduced by state and federal freedom of information laws. 
In contrast to public records, the right to inspect court records was 
generally broader and was shaped by the supervisory authority of the 
courts.102  The courts had a long tradition of permitting open access to 
court records, and access was rarely limited based on the purposes for 
which the records were sought.103 
In 1978, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,104 the Supreme 
Court took notice of the right to inspect and copy both public records and 
court records: “It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a gen-
eral right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents.”105 The Nixon Court noted that “[i]n 
1893). 
 97. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 26. 
 98. See id. at 27; Public Inspection, supra note 95, at 1108. 
 99. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 29.  As one court explained, “We cannot find any 
valid basis in our society for the imposition of the requirement of the interest stated in the 
common-law rule as a prerequisite to the right to inspect public records.” City of St. Mat-
thews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974). 
 100. Voice of St. Matthews,  519 S.W.2d at 815; Husband, C. v. Wife, C., 320 A.2d 
717, 723 (Del. 1974) (characterizing the common law approach as permitting access to 
judicial records if a person “has an interest therein for some useful purpose and not for 
mere curiosity”). 
 101. See, e.g., Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972); see also 
Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age: 
Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 543, 556 
(1993) (“Most states depended on the discretion of agencies, or on the common law, to 
provide public access to government records until they were inspired by the federal FOIA 
to codify the concept of open government.  The common law had varied among states, 
with most courts requiring a person requesting a record to have a legitimate interest in, and 
a useful purpose for, the requested record.”). 
 102. See Key, supra note 89, at 668 (“Consistent with state court decisions, federal 
courts historically allowed, absent sensitive circumstances, anyone to inspect and copy 
judicial records for any purpose.”). 
 103. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 135-36. 
 104. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
 105. Id. at 597. 
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contrast to the English practice, American decisions generally do not 
condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in the docu-
ment or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit.”106  The Court ex-
plained that the right to access public records is justified by “the citizen’s 
desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, and in a 
newspaper publisher’s intention to publish information concerning the 
operation of government.”107 
The right of access to court records differs from the right to access 
other public records.  As the Nixon Court noted, the common law right of 
access applies to court records; however, the right is not absolute.108 The 
Court observed that “[e]very court has supervisory power over its own 
records and files, and access has been denied where court files might 
have become a vehicle for improper purposes.”109 The Court noted that 
public access has been denied where records would have been used to 
promote scandal by revealing embarrassing personal information, to 
serve as “reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption,” or to 
harm a litigant’s business.110  The decision over whether to permit access 
“is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to 
be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case.”111  Thus, the common law protects privacy in the context of 
court records by giving judges discretion over access to their records and 
proceedings.112 
In the federal court system, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(c), judges have discretion “for good cause shown” to issue pro-
tective orders to shield information from disclosure where it might cause 
a party “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense.”113  Rule 26(c) was part of the original version of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in 1938.114  The Federal Rules explic-
itly provided for protective orders because the Rules significantly ex-
panded pretrial discovery to encompass almost all information that could 
 106. Id. (citation omitted). 
 107. Id. at 598 (citations omitted). 
 108. Id.; see also United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (cit-
ing Nixon for the proposition that right of access is not absolute); United States v. Amo-
deo, 71 F.3d. 1044, 1047-50 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying a balancing test to determine if pub-
lic access is proper). 
 109. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 599. 
 112. Judicial discretion over access is, of course, constrained by the First Amendment.  
See infra Part III.A. 
 113. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
 114. Id. 
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be of help in the preparation of the case.115  This broad expansion created 
a new threat to privacy, as the Rules did not differentiate between private 
and non-private information.  To protect privacy, as well as other inter-
ests such as trade secrets, Rule 26(c) was designed to limit the use of dis-
coverable information beyond the context of the litigation.116  Most states 
have modeled their discovery provisions, including protective orders, on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.117 
Federal courts have held that there is a presumption in favor of ac-
cess to court records.118  When seeking a protective order, the party seek-
ing to maintain the confidentiality of a record has the burden of overcom-
ing the presumption in favor of access.119  Courts balance a party’s 
interest in privacy against the public interest in disclosure.120  If a court 
decides to deny access, it “must set forth substantial reasons.”121 
Generally, documents disclosed to parties in discovery but not filed 
in court are not subject to the common law right of access.122  According 
to the Supreme Court in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,123 “pretrial 
depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial.  
Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law, and, in 
general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.”124 
Courts retain discretion to issue special orders to keep certain pro-
ceedings and information confidential.  A court will sometimes, under 
very limited circumstances, seal court proceedings such as trials.125 
Courts can seal court records if the parties’ desire for confidentiality 
outweighs the need for public access.126  A trial court can permit a plain-
 115. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to 
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984). 
 118. See, e.g., United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Pansy 
v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3rd Cir. 1994); SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 
990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 
1986). 
 119. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408-10 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 120. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602. 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 413 (6th  Cir. 1986). 
 122. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at  33. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (citations omitted). 
 125. See, e.g., Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. 
of Cal., 183 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1999).  The court must find that those excluded have 
“a reasonable opportunity to state their objections” and the court must make the following 
specific factual findings: that “(1) closure serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a sub-
stantial probability that, in the absence of closure, this compelling interest would be 
harmed; and (3) there are no alternatives to closure that would adequately protect the com-
pelling interest.” Id. 
 126. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994); CAL. CT. 
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tiff to proceed anonymously with the use of a pseudonym.127  Courts can 
also permit anonymous juries when jurors might otherwise be placed in 
danger.128  These decisions, however, are within the discretion of the trial 
court,129 and courts differ greatly in the exercise of their discretion.  For 
example, one court permitted a woman raped at a train station who sued 
Amtrak to keep her identity secret because of the potential embarrass-
ment she would suffer if the fact she was raped became widely dis-
closed.130  In contrast, another court held that a victim of sexual assault 
could not sue her assailant for civil damages under a pseudonym because 
“[f]airness requires that she be prepared to stand behind her charges pub-
licly” and because she was “seeking to vindicate primarily her own inter-
ests.”131 
In sum, under modern American common law, there is a limited 
right to access public records so long as one’s purpose is not improper.  
For court records, the common law right to access follows the supervi-
sory authority of the courts, and judges have significant discretion in 
granting or denying access.132 
2. Freedom of Information Laws 
State legislatures gradually replaced or supplemented the court-
created right of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with open 
records statutes, which generally mandated open access.133 These statutes 
are often entitled or referred to as “freedom of information,” “open ac-
R. 243.1(d)(1)-(5) (providing that a court may seal records if there is an “overriding inter-
est that overcomes the right of public access to the record” and the sealing is “narrowly 
tailored” and “[n]o less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest”). 
 127. See, e.g., Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Bell Atl. 
Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995); see also James v. Jacobson, 6 
F.3d 233, 238-42 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322-24 (11th Cir. 1992).  
The use of pseudonyms is rare and reserved only for exceptional cases.  “It is the excep-
tional case in which a plaintiff may proceed under a fictitious name.”  Id. at  323. 
 128. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, Court Access: The Privacy Para-
dox, at http://www.rcfp.org/pp_pt3.html (last visited June 29, 2002). 
 129. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786. 
 130. See Doe v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CIU.A. 94-5064, 1997 WL 116979, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1997). 
 131. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. at 361; see also Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., 162 F.R.D. at 422 
(D. Mass. 1995) (rejecting use of pseudonym for plaintiff alleging a sexual assault by her 
supervisor at work and that she might have been infected with HIV). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811-15 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 133. See Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 
URB. LAW. 65, 69-70 (1996); Jason Lawrence Cagle, Note, Protecting Privacy on the 
Front Page: Why Restrictions on Commercial Use of Law Enforcement Records Violate 
the First Amendment, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1422 n.2 (1999).  While some states’ 
FOIAs replaced the common law, courts in some states have held that the state’s FOIA 
operates as an additional right of access to the common law.  See id.  
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cess,” “right to know,” or “sunshine” laws.  States were initially slow in 
enacting statutory public access rights; by 1940, only twelve states had 
open records statutes.134 
In 1946, the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA) contained 
a limited provision for disclosure of government records.135  However, 
under § 3 of the APA, information could be withheld if it involved “any 
function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest” or 
was “required for good cause to be held confidential.”136 
In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
dramatically reforming public access to government records.  According 
to the Senate Report for FOIA, the APA was “full of loopholes which al-
low agencies to deny legitimate information to the public” and that in-
formation was often “withheld only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or 
irregularities.”137 When he signed the FOIA into law, President Lyndon 
Johnson declared, 
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy 
works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Na-
tion permits.  No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions 
which can be revealed without injury to the public interest.138 
As Fred Cate observes, the FOIA serves three purposes: “first and 
most important, ensure public access to the information necessary to 
evaluate the conduct of government officials; second, ensure public ac-
cess to information concerning public policy; and third, protect against 
secret laws, rules and decisionmaking.”139 
Under FOIA, “any person” (including associations, organizations, 
and foreign citizens) may request “records” maintained by an executive 
agency.140  FOIA does not apply to records kept by Congress or the Judi-
ciary.141 Requesters of records do not need to state a reason for request-
ing records.142 
 134. See Public Inspection, supra note 95, at 1107. 
 135. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946). 
 136. Id., superceded by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  For a 
discussion of the ineffectiveness of the APA, see Bunker et al., supra note 101, at 552-53. 
 137. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965).  The House Report likewise noted that under § 3 
of the APA, “[g]overnment agencies whose mistakes cannot bear public scrutiny have 
found ‘good cause’ for secrecy.” H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497 (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2423. 
 138. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. 
JOHNSON 699 (1967), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 8 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3451. 
 139. Fred H. Cate et al.,  The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The 
“Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 65 (1994). 
 140. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 141. See id. § 552(f). 
 142. See, e.g., United States  Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 
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Today, all fifty states have open records statutes, a majority of 
which are modeled after the FOIA.143  Like the federal FOIA, state 
FOIAs are justified by a strong commitment to openness and transpar-
ency.144 
Many states, following FOIA, eliminated the common law require-
ment of requesters establishing an interest in obtaining the records.145  
Indeed, the federal FOIA and many state FOIAs allow information to be 
obtained by anybody for any reason.146  Most state FOIAs contain a pre-
sumption in favor of disclosure.147 
Open access laws never mandate absolute disclosure.  They contain 
exemptions, typically (although not always) including an exemption to 
protect individual privacy.  The federal FOIA contains nine enumerated 
exemptions to disclosure, two of which pertain to privacy.  Exemption 6 
exempts from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files 
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy.”148  Exemption 7(C) exempts from disclosure “re-
cords or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . [which] 
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.149  If possible, private information can be deleted from 
records, and the redacted records disclosed to the requester.150 
The federal FOIA does not require that a person be given notice that 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989). 
 143. Jackson, supra note 26, at 111; Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 65-66. 
 144. See, e.g.,  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 (1997) (stating that “it is vital that 
citizens have easy access to public records in order that the society remain free and democ-
ratic”); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.  140/1 (1) (West 1993) (stating that the right to inspect 
public records “is necessary to enable the people to fulfill their duties of discussing public 
issues fully and freely”); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2(1) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
132-6(a) (1999); Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972). 
 145. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6(b) (1999). 
 146. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771 (stating that the federal FOIA provides the 
same access rights to the general public as it does to those asserting a particular interest in 
a document); Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 78 (noting that many state FOIAs eliminated 
the requirement of demonstrating need or stating purpose); see also  IOWA CODE ANN. § 
22.2(1) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6(b) (1999) (“No person . . . shall be required to 
disclose the purpose or motive for the request.”); State Employees Ass’n v. Dep’t of 
Mgmt. and Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 616 (Mich. 1987) (holding that Michigan’s FOIA 
does not require a person to justify her request for access); Mans, 290 A.2d at 867 (de-
scribing the elimination of common law discrimination based on the purpose of the record 
seeker in New Hampshire’s Right to Know Law). 
 147. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 66 & n.6 (conducting a comprehensive survey of 
all state FOIAs as to the presumption of disclosure). 
 148. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). 
 149. Id.  § 552(b)(7)(C). 
 150. See id.  § 552(b). 
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his or her personal information is encompassed within a FOIA request.151  
Even if an individual finds out about the request, she has no right under 
FOIA to prevent or second-guess an agency’s decision to disclose the re-
cords.  FOIA does not require that the government withhold informa-
tion.152  It is up to the government agency to assert and to litigate the in-
dividual’s privacy interest.153 
State FOIA privacy exemptions come in myriad shapes and sizes.  
Many state sunshine laws contain a privacy exemption similar  to that 
found in the FOIA,154 applying when disclosure would constitute a 
“clearly unwarranted” invasion of privacy.”155  However, not all state 
FOIAs have a privacy exemption.  Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Act156 
does not contain a privacy exemption; it  prohibits only access to records 
“which would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person’s repu-
tation or personal security.”157  As one court stated, “the phrase ‘personal 
security’ does not mean ‘personal privacy.’”158 Ohio’s Public Records 
Act does not contain any privacy exemption.159 
The privacy exemptions in state FOIAs have often been expanded or 
constricted by judicial interpretation.160  In applying FOIA privacy ex-
emptions, many states go along with the federal FOIA approach and bal-
 151. Heather Harrison, Note, Protecting Personal Information from Unauthorized 
Government Disclosures, 22 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 775, 787 (1992). 
 152. Cate et al., supra note 139, at 49; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: 
Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 
553, 593 (1995). 
 153. In contrast, companies seeking to protect trade secrets can initiate actions on their 
own to protect their information in what is known as a “reverse-FOIA” lawsuit.  See Harri-
son, supra note 151, at 783.  
 154. Jackson, supra note 26, at 114. 
 155. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN.  § 2-534(a)(2) (Lexis 2001) (applying a privacy ex-
ception where disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.  § 15.243(1)(a) (1994) (stating that the privacy excep-
tion applies “where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy”). 
 156. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.  §§ 66.1-66.4 (2000). 
 157. Id. § 66.1(2). 
 158. Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 329 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974). 
 159. See 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 2001) (listing ex-
ceptions to disclosure); see also State ex rel. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland, 661 
N.E.2d 187, 193-95 (Ohio 1996) (Resnick, J., concurring) (criticizing the lack of a privacy 
exception in Ohio’s Public Records Act). 
 160. For example, in In re Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Wash. 1986), the court ex-
panded the scope of the personal privacy exception under Washington’s Public Disclosure 
Act to encompass anything that is connected to an individual or that reveals something 
“unique” about an individual.  A number of states have held that certain forms of public 
record information (such as names and addresses) are not “private” because they do not 
involve intimate or embarrassing details.  See supra notes 155, 159 and accompanying 
text. 
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ance interests of privacy against the interests of public access.161  How-
ever, states have adopted widely differing approaches often stemming 
from vastly different judicial conceptions of privacy. 
It is critical to note that the federal FOIA was passed before the rise 
of computer databases.  In 1996, due to the development of modern com-
puter technology, Congress passed the Electronic Freedom of Informa-
tion Amendments (E-FOIA)162 which amended the FOIA to enable any 
person to access electronic documents (including e-mail messages) in the 
same way he or she could access paper documents.163  Agencies must es-
tablish an index to the documents they possess and make the index avail-
able on the Internet.164  Further, agencies must establish “electronic read-
ing rooms” where people can read documents online.165  The electronic 
reading room must contain documents that are likely to be requested mul-
tiple times.166 As states computerize their records, these computer data-
bases are often encompassed within the broad definition of “public re-
cords” in many state FOIAs.167  Some states explicitly include 
computerized information in their definitions of public records.168 
3. Privacy Acts 
The federal Privacy Act was borne out of fears of computerized da-
tabases.  Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, social commentators began 
to voice privacy concerns about computerized databases.169  People 
feared the eventual creation of a national database using the Social Secu-
rity number as the primary identifier.170  Throughout the mid-1960s and 
1970s, Congress devoted a significant amount of attention to the prob-
 161. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 79. At least one state has rejected such an ap-
proach, opting to apply the exception by determining solely whether such information is 
private (but adopting a rather narrow conception of privacy).  See State Employees Ass’n 
v. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 611-13 (Mich. 1987). 
 162. Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(2) (2000)). 
 163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 70. 
 168. Id. at 70, 75 & n.16. 
 169. See, e.g., MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 14 (1964); MILLER, supra 
note 52; NOMOS XII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971); ALAN F. 
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); WESTIN & BAKER, supra note 6, at 3-5; Ken-
neth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored 
Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 359-63 (1966).  See generally Sympo-
sium, Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1968). 
 170. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 95 (1995).   
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lem.171 In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) issued a profoundly influential report about computer databases, 
condemning the trend toward making the Social Security number a uni-
versal identifier.172  The report noted a growing public “distrust” with 
computer record-keeping systems173 and no “coherent or conceptually 
unified approach to balancing the interests of society and the organiza-
tions that compile and use records against the interests of individuals who 
are the subjects of records.”174  The report recommended that a code of 
Fair Information Practices should be enacted:  
x There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence 
is secret. 
x There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him 
is in a record and how it is used. 
x There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him ob-
tained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes 
without his consent. 
x There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifi-
able information about him. 
x Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended 
use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.175 
In 1974, after years of apprehension over computer databases, Con-
gress finally passed the Privacy Act.176  The Privacy Act, embodying the 
Fair Information Practices, gives individuals the right to access and correct 
information about themselves held by federal agencies and restricts federal 
agencies’ collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.  Accord-
ing to the Act, “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in 
a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to 
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior 
written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains . . . .”177 
Agencies can only maintain information about individuals that is “relevant 
and necessary” to accomplish a particular purpose of the agency.178  When 
collecting personal information, agencies must inform individuals about 
the purposes for which the information is to be used, and the effects on the 
 171. Id. at 71-74. 
 172. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND 
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 108-35 (1973) [hereinafter HEW  1973 REPORT]. 
 173. See id. at 28. 
 174. Id. at 35. 
 175. Id. at 41-42. 
 176. See REGAN, supra note 170, at  8. 
 177. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000). 
 178. Id.  § 552a(e)(1). 
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individual for not providing any of the requested data.179 Agencies must 
ensure “security and confidentiality of records.”180  Further, individuals 
can review their records upon request181 and ask an agency to correct inac-
curate data.182  The Privacy Act authorizes individuals to bring civil ac-
tions if agencies do not correct an individual’s record, fail to give an in-
dividual access to her record, maintain a shoddy record that results in an 
adverse determination against an individual, or fail to comply with any 
provision of the Privacy Act that results in an adverse effect on an indi-
vidual.183 
Additionally, the Privacy Act gives citizens certain rights regarding 
the use of their Social Security numbers.  Unlike the rest of the Privacy 
Act, which applies only to federal agencies,  § 7 of the Privacy Act 
makes it “unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to 
deny any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law be-
cause of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account 
number.”184 
The Privacy Act, however, failed to bring the growing uses of Social 
Security numbers under control.  The use of the Social Security number 
continued to escalate after the Privacy Act.185  The reason for this failure 
arose in part because the Privacy Act’s Social Security number provi-
sions are limited only to the public sector.186  As a result, Social Security 
numbers are frequently collected by private sector entities, and it is cur-
rently legal for these entities to sell or disclose Social Security numbers.  
Further, Congress frequently made exceptions to the Act to expand the 
uses of SSNs.187 
In addition to the problems with its regulation of Social Security 
numbers, the Privacy Act has other significant limitations.  The Privacy 
 179. Id. § 552a(e)(3). 
 180. Id. § 552a(e)(10). 
 181. Id. § 552a(d)(1). 
 182. Id. § 552a(d)(2). 
 183. Id. § 552a(g)(1). 
 184. Id. § 552a note. 
 185. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON 
SOC. SEC., COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: SOCIAL 
SECURITY: GOV’T AND COMMERCIAL USE OF THE SOC. SEC. NUMBER IS WIDESPREAD 4, 
7-12 (1999). 
 186. See id. at 78; see also Use and Misuse of Social Security Numbers: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 
(2000) (testimony of Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Cen-
ter) (urging new legislation to protect widespread uses of Social Security numbers). 
 187. PHILIPPA STRUM, PRIVACY 50-51 (1998); Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your 
Number: An Overview of Legislation and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security 
Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 569 
(1998). 
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Act is limited only to the public sector.188 The Act applies only to fed-
eral, not state and local agencies.  Further, the Act has been eroded by 
about a dozen exceptions.189 For example, agencies can disclose informa-
tion without the consent of individuals to the Census Bureau, to law en-
forcement entities, to Congress, and to consumer reporting agencies.190  
When FOIA requires that information be released, the Privacy Act does 
not apply.191  Nor does the Privacy Act apply to court records.192 
The broadest exception is that information may be disclosed for any 
“routine use” if disclosure is “compatible” with the purpose for which the 
agency collected the information.193 The “routine use” exception has re-
peatedly been criticized as being a gigantic loophole.194  For example, in 
1977, the federal government began matching its computer employee re-
cords with the records of people receiving federal benefits to detect 
fraud.195  Records in different government benefit programs were also 
compared.196 Through this automated investigatory technique, the gov-
ernment investigated millions of people quickly, efficiently, and secretly. 
This sharing of records between different government agencies, ordinar-
ily a violation of the Privacy Act, was justified under the “routine use” 
exception.197  In 1988, Congress finally passed a law regulating this prac-
tice,198 but the law has been strongly criticized as providing scant sub-
 188. Although privacy advocates in Congress wanted the Act to extend to the private 
sector, President Ford threatened to veto the law if it extended beyond public records.  
Sandra L. Macklin, Students’ Rights in Indiana: Wrongful Distribution of Student Records 
and Potential Remedies, 74 IND. L.J. 1321, 1325 (1999). 
 189. See STRUM, supra note 187, at 50-51. 
 190. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12) (2000). 
 191. See id. § 552a(t)(2); Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
819 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 192. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(B), 552(f); see also United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 
992,1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Warth v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 521, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 193. 5 U.S.C. §§  552a(b)(3). 
 194. See Schwartz, supra note 152, at  585-87 (describing criticism of the “routine use 
exemption” and advancing his own criticisms). 
 195. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 86.  As Priscilla Regan has noted, surprisingly, 
the Fourth Amendment implications of computer matchings have not been litigated.  See 
id. at 90. 
 196. See Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: 
THE NEW LANDSCAPE 198-99 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997). 
 197. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 87. 
 198. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), 
(o)-(r), (u) (2000)).  The CMPPA requires agencies to formulate procedural agreements 
before exchanging computerized record systems and establishes Data Integrity Boards 
within each agency to oversee matching, requires agencies to perform a cost-benefit analy-
sis of proposed matching endeavors, and requires agencies to notify individuals of the ter-
mination of benefits due to computer matching and permit them an opportunity to refute 
the termination.  Id. 
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stantive guidance and having little practical effect.199 As Robert Gellman 
correctly notes with regard to the “routine use” exception, “[t]his vague 
formula has not created much of a substantive barrier to external disclo-
sure of personal information.”200 
Although the Privacy Act requires an individual’s permission before 
his or her records can be disclosed, redress for violations of the Act is 
virtually impossible to obtain.201  The Privacy Act provides individuals 
with a monetary remedy for disclosures of personal information only if 
the disclosure was made “willfully and intentionally.”202  This restriction 
on recovery of damages fails to redress the most common form of mis-
takes—those due to carelessness. This leaves little incentive to bring 
suit.203  For example, in Andrews v. Veterans Administration,204 the Vet-
erans Administration released inadequately redacted personnel records of 
nurses resulting in what the court called a “substantial” violation of 
nurses’ privacy.  However, the agency could not be sued under the Pri-
vacy Act because it acted negligently, not willfully.205  Paul Schwartz 
aptly notes that “individuals who seek to enforce their rights under the 
Privacy Act face numerous statutory hurdles, limited damages, and scant 
chance to effect an agency’s overall behavior.”206 
Although several states have promulgated statutes protecting pri-
vacy in certain narrow contexts, less than a third have enacted a general 
privacy law akin to the Privacy Act.207  As Paul Schwartz observes, most 
 199. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: QUALITY OF 
DECISIONS AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES LITTLE AFFECTED BY 1988 ACT 3 (1993) 
(“[T]he implementation of these new procedures does not appear to have had major effects 
on the most important review process. . . .”); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ  &  JOEL R. 
REIDENBERG,  DATA PRIVACY LAW 101 (1996); Schwartz, supra note 152, at 588 (the 
CMPPA “creates no substantive guidelines to determine when matching is acceptable”); 
INFO. POL’Y COMM., NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR 
PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: DRAFT FOR 
PUBLIC COMMENT 10, at http://www.iitf.doc.gov/ipc/privacy.htm  (1997). 
 200. Gellman, supra note 196, at 198.  
 201. See id. (pointing out that there is no administrative process in place to challenge 
agencies’ disclosures); Harrison, supra note 151, at 787 (noting that “some persons who 
may have had their privacy violated by unauthorized agency actions received no remedy 
for their injury”); Todd Robert Coles, Comment, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect 
Your Right to Privacy? An Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 
957, 975 n.118 (1991) (stating that the “individual’s ability to be made whole” has been 
“crippled” under the Privacy Act). 
 202. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000). 
 203. Coles, supra note 201, at 975 n. 118. 
 204. 838 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 205. Id. at 425. 
 206. Schwartz, supra note 152, at  596. 
 207. See id. at 605. For a compilation of state privacy laws, see ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, 
COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 3-66 (1997). 
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states lack “omnibus data protection laws” and have “scattered laws 
[that] provide only limited protections for personal information in the 
public sector.”208 
4. Access and Use Restrictions 
Confronted with increased information trade, some states have at-
tempted to restrict access to personal information in public records as 
well as certain uses of personal information obtained from public records. 
In the last decade, a number of states have enacted access restrictions for 
some of their public records, often excluding access for the commercial 
uses of soliciting business or marketing services or products.  For exam-
ple, Georgia amended its public records law in 1991 making it unlawful 
to access law enforcement or motor vehicle accident records “for any 
commercial solicitation of such individuals or relatives of such individu-
als.”209 In 1992, Louisiana restricted access to accident records for com-
mercial solicitation purposes.210  Kentucky, in response to “a public 
groundswell [that] developed against the release of accident reports to 
attorneys and chiropractors,”211 amended its public records law in 1994 
to restrict access for these and other commercial uses.212 In 1996, Florida 
restricted the access of driver information in traffic citations from those 
seeking it for commercial solicitation purposes.213  Colorado prohibited 
access to criminal justice records unless those seeking access signed a 
statement that such records would not be used “for the direct solicitation 
of business for pecuniary gain.”214  California recently restricted access 
to arrest records by providing that the records “shall not be used directly 
or indirectly to sell a product or service . . . and the requester shall exe-
cute a declaration to that effect under penalty of perjury.”215  Almost half 
of the states prohibit the commercial use of voter registration records.216 
 208. Schwartz, supra note 152, at  605. 
 209. GA. CODE ANN.  § 35-1-9 (Harrison 1998). 
 210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 32:398(H) (West Supp. 2002). 
 211. Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 896 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 212. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.635 (Michie Supp. 2001). 
 213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.650(11) (West 2001).  The law explicitly noted that it did 
not apply to media publication or “when used to inform a person of the availability of 
driver safety training.” Id. 
 214. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-305.5 (2001). 
 215. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 2002). 
 216. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Government Finds Information Pays, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 9, 1998, at A1.  For example, California provides that voter registration lists may 
only be released to candidates, political committees, or for “election, scholarly, journalis-
tic, political, or governmental purposes.” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(2) (West Supp. 
2002).  Florida prohibits the use of lists of registered voters for any use other than uses 
“related to elections, political or governmental activities, voter registration, or law en-
forcement.”  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.095(2) (West Supp. 2002). 
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The federal government also has certain access restrictions for its 
public records.  Pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 
reports of contributors to political committees are “available for public 
inspection . . . except that any information copied from such reports . . . 
may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting con-
tributions or for commercial purposes.”217 
In sum, although in certain contexts laws are beginning to limit ac-
cess to public records for some purposes, the vast majority of public re-
cords remain virtually unrestricted in access. 
 
 
5. Restrictions on State Information Practices 
 In a rare instance, the federal government has directly regulated the 
states’ use of public records. In 1994, Congress passed the Driver’s Pri-
vacy Protection Act (DPPA) to curtail the practice of many states of sell-
ing their motor vehicle records to marketers.218  Pursuant to DPPA, “A 
State department of motor vehicles . . . shall not knowingly disclose or 
otherwise make available to any person or entity personal information 
about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a 
motor vehicle record . . . .” 219 
Originally, DPPA provided that if an individual did not opt out, then 
information could be used for any purpose.  In 1999, Congress amended 
DPPA, changing the opt-out provision to an opt-in requirement, forcing 
states to require a driver’s consent before disclosing personal information 
to marketers. 
 In Reno v. Condon,220 the Supreme Court concluded that DPPA was 
a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce:  
The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by 
insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate com-
merce to contact drivers with customized solicitations.  The information is also 
used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities 
 217. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2000).  Although the FEC occasionally uses decoy names 
to check to see if candidates are engaging in improper uses of the records, the FEC has not, 
according to critics, done much to investigate reports of abuse. See  Chandrasekaran,  su-
pra note 216, at A1. 
 218. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2721-25 (2000)). 
 219. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (2000) (“Under the amended DPPA, States may not imply 
consent from a driver’s failure to take advantage of a state-afforded opportunity to block 
disclosure, but must rather obtain a driver’s affirmative consent to disclose . . . personal 
information for use in surveys, marketing, solicitations, and other restricted pur-
poses . . . .”). 
 220.  528 U.S. 141, 144-45 (2000). 
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for matters related to interstate motoring.221 
The Court correctly recognized that information is an essential as-
pect of commerce and that it is a matter appropriately within Congress’s 
power to regulate.  Further, the Court concluded that DPPA does not “re-
quire the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citi-
zens”222 because DPPA “regulates the States as the owners of databases” 
and does not require them to enact regulation or to assist in enforcing 
federal statutes concerning private individuals.223 
Although DPPA is an important first step in bringing state public 
records systems under control, DPPA applies only to motor vehicle re-
cords and does not forbid the dissemination of all the other public records 
states maintain. 
6. Conclusion: The Regulatory Regime of Public Records 
As illustrated above, states vary significantly in what information 
they make publicly available. Often such decisions are made by agencies 
and bureaucrats or left to the discretion of the courts.  Decisions as to the 
scope of access—whether one must obtain a record by physically going 
to a local agency office, by engaging in correspondence by mail, or by 
simply downloading it from the Internet—are often made by local bu-
reaucrats.  Frequently, it is up to the individual to take significant steps to 
protect privacy, such as overcoming the presumption of access to court 
records.  In many instances, individuals are never even given notice or an 
opportunity to assert a privacy interest when records containing their per-
sonal information are disclosed. 
Differing protection of personal information with no minimum floor 
of protection presents significant problems in today’s age of increasing 
mobility and information flow.224 There is no federal law establishing a 
baseline for the regulation of public records.  Thus, personal information 
is regulated by a bewildering assortment of state statutory protections, 
which vary widely from state to state. As Paul Schwartz notes, “[s]tate 
data protection law in the United States is largely unchartered terri-
tory.”225  “Some data protection exists in every state,” he observes, “but 
no two states have adopted precisely the same system of regulation.”226 
This chaotic state of affairs is troublesome in an Information Age 
 221. Id. at 148. 
 222. Id. at 151. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Bruce D. Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Per-
sonal Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY 
L.J. 1185, 1205-06 (1992) (critiquing the lack of uniformity in state public records laws). 
 225. Schwartz, supra note 152, at 604. 
 226. Id. 
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where information so fluidly passes throughout the country and is being 
made more widely available by the Internet and through private compa-
nies.  The privacy protection that currently exists for public records is 
largely designed for a world of paper records and has been slow to adapt 
to an age where information can be downloaded from the Internet in an 
instant. 
  
 
II.  ACCESS AND AGGREGATION: RETHINKING PRIVACY AND 
PUBLIC RECORDS     
A. THE TENSION BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY 
A 1998 episode of a television newsmagazine illustrates one way 
that the tension between transparency and privacy can arise.227  A man, 
imprisoned for murder, obtained under a state FOIA the address of a 
former girlfriend.228  When she learned that her ex-boyfriend obtained 
her address, the woman became quite scared because her ex-boyfriend 
was prone to losing his temper and held a grudge against her.229  She 
lived in fear, knowing that someday he would be released and might 
come after her.230 The prisoner, however, claimed that he was the father 
of her child and needed the address because he wanted to file a paternity 
suit.231  This story illustrates why it is important for people to be able to 
obtain certain information about others, yet also demonstrates the dan-
gers and threat to privacy caused by the ready availability of information. 
There are at least four general functions of transparency: (1) to shed 
sunshine on governmental activities and proceedings; (2) to find out in-
formation about public officials and candidates for public office; (3) to 
facilitate certain social transactions, such as selling property or initiating 
lawsuits; and (4) to find out information about other individuals for a va-
riety of purposes.  I will discuss each in turn. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, transparency provides the pub-
lic with knowledge about the government and an understanding of how it 
functions.232  By promoting awareness of the workings of government, 
transparency serves a “watchdog” function.  Open access to government 
 227. Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 30, 1998). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (discuss-
ing the benefits to the public of conducting open criminal trials). 
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proceedings ensures that they are conducted fairly.233  Public access ex-
poses the government to public scrutiny and enables a check on abuse 
and corruption.234  “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,” de-
clared Justice Brandeis, “electric light the most efficient policeman.”235  
As courts have observed, making arrest records public provides “valuable 
protection against secret arrests and improper police tactics,”236 and pre-
serves “the integrity of the law enforcement and judicial processes”237 by 
ensuring that the public can prevent abuse of the government’s power to 
arrest individuals.238 Open access to public court records “allows the citi-
zenry to monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, 
honesty, and respect for our legal system.”239  As James Madison ob-
served, “A popular Government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, per-
haps both.  Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who 
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power 
which knowledge gives.”240  According to Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes: 
  It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take place under the pub-
lic eye not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public 
concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer jus-
tice should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every 
citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in 
which a public duty is performed.241   
Access to court records permits people to examine the information 
considered by courts making decisions affecting the public at large.  Is-
sues raised in a product liability case could have significance for millions 
of others who use a product.  Information about how certain types of 
cases are resolved—such as domestic abuse cases, medical malpractice 
cases, and others—is important for assessing the competency of the judi-
cial system for resolving important social matters.  Scholars and the me-
 233. Id. at 569. 
 234. Id. 
 235. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1932). 
 236. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 606 (1968) (per curiam) 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) (quotations omitted); see also Davis v. North Carolina, 310 F.2d 
904, 910 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (Haynsworth, J., dissenting) (recycling on the police 
record to examine police tactics); Engrav v. Cragun, 769 P.2d 1224, 1228  (Mont. 1989); 
Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 186 (Tex. App. 1975) 
(discussing the legitimate interests for disclosure of police records). 
 237. United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 238. United States v. Ross, 259 F. Supp. 388, 390 (D.D.C. 1966). 
 239. In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 240. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 241. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). 
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dia need to look beyond a judicial decision or a jury verdict to scrutinize 
records and evidence in a case.  The ability to identify jurors enables the 
media to question them about the reasons for their verdict. Courts and 
commentators have pointed out that the Watergate Scandal might never 
have been uncovered if the original bail hearing had been closed to the 
press because reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein would not 
have been suspicious that expensive attorneys were representing the bur-
glars.242 
The second function of transparency is to enable the scrutiny of pub-
lic officials or candidates for public office.  Information about a politi-
cian’s criminal history might be informative to many voters.  Information 
about a politician’s property may provide insight into the politician’s 
wealth, a factor that might shape the politician’s values and public deci-
sions.  Some voters may find a politician’s divorce records and marital 
history illustrative of a politician’s character.  Other possibly informative 
information about a politician could include that she was sued many 
times or sued others many times; that she once declared bankruptcy; that 
she never voted in any elections; that she was formerly registered in an-
other political party; that she owns property in other states; and so on.  
Open access to public records enables voters to find out such information 
to make more informed choices at the polls. 
Third, transparency facilitates certain social transactions.  Access to 
public records is an essential function for the sale and transfer of prop-
erty, as it enables people to trace ownership and title in land.  Public re-
cord information is useful in locating witnesses for judicial proceedings 
as well as locating heirs to estates.  Further, access to public records can 
allow individuals and entities to track down individuals they want to sue 
and to obtain the necessary information to serve them with process. 
The fourth function of transparency is to enable people to find out 
information about individuals for various other purposes.  Public records 
can help verify individual identity, investigate fraud, and locate lost 
friends and classmates.  Public records enable law enforcement officials 
to locate criminals and investigate crimes, and can assist in tracking 
down deadbeat parents.243  Public records can permit people to investi-
gate babysitters or child care professionals.  Employers can use public 
record information to screen potential employees, such as examining the 
past driving records of prospective truck drivers or taxicab drivers. 
Criminal history information might be relevant when hiring a worker in a 
 242. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 n.25 (5th Cir. 1983); G. Michael 
Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To  Richmond Newspapers and 
Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 436 n.109 (1981). 
 243. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 216. 
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child care facility or when hiring a kindergarten teacher.244 
Transparency, however, can come into tension with privacy.  Can 
both of these important values be reconciled?  Before turning to this 
question, I must first address how the privacy problem that public records 
contribute to should be understood.  Commentators have long struggled 
over defining what privacy is and why it is important, especially in the 
context of information collection and use.245 We must rethink certain 
longstanding notions about privacy before we can reach an appropriate 
balance between transparency and privacy. 
B. CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY AND PUBLIC RECORDS 
1. Access: The Public is Private 
One of the longstanding conceptions of privacy is that it involves 
secrecy and is lost once information is disclosed.  I call this the “secrecy 
paradigm.” According to this paradigm, an invasion of privacy consists 
of concealed information being unveiled or released in some way to oth-
ers.  Another central form of invasion is being watched or listened to 
both surreptitiously or in the open.  The harms caused by these invasions 
of privacy are self-censorship and reputational damage.246 
This paradigm is so embedded in our privacy discourse that privacy 
is often represented visually by a roving eye, an open keyhole, or a per-
son peeking through Venetian blinds.  Further, this paradigm explains 
why the Big Brother metaphor has become so widely used for depicting 
privacy problems.247  Much of privacy law has developed around this 
paradigm.  For example, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court has routinely held that there is no expectation of privacy 
whenever it is possible that something can be seen or heard from a public 
vantage point, even if that perception is through a sensory enhancement 
device.248  Accordingly, the Court has held that there is no expectation of 
 244. I am not contending that all of these purposes are desirable uses of public record 
data, especially since many of them constitute significant invasions of an individual’s pri-
vacy.  However, many people view these purposes as highly beneficial. 
 245. See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992) (“Ex-
ploring the concept of privacy resembles exploring an unknown swamp.”); MILLER, supra 
note 52, at 25; Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 
1984) (stating that “nobody has a clear idea” of what the right to privacy means); Ruth 
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980) (stating that com-
mentators have urged looking past the rhetoric to truly understand privacy law). 
 246. Solove, supra note 7, at 1394-99. 
 247. Id. at 1396. 
 248. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
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privacy when the government uses a sophisticated aerial camera to pho-
tograph objects that cannot be seen by the naked eye,249 or when third 
parties have access to information.250 
Along with this paradigm, privacy is often understood as an exclu-
sive status or domain.  Information is categorized as either public or pri-
vate. When information is private, it is hidden, and as long as it is kept 
secret, it remains private.  On the other hand, when information is public, 
it is in the public domain available for any use, and a person can no 
longer claim that the information is private.  Understood this way, infor-
mation has a particular status; it can either be in one domain or another. 
The law often treats information in this black-and-white manner; either it 
is wholly private or wholly public. 
 In the Information Age, this paradigm is outmoded, and it could 
lead to the practical extinction of privacy.  Unless we live as hermits, 
there is no way to exist in modern society without leaving information 
traces wherever we go.  Life today is fueled by information, and it is vir-
tually impossible to live as an Information Age ghost, leaving no trail or 
residue.  Does this mean that privacy is no longer possible?  The answer 
to this question is yes only if we adhere to the dichotomous conception of 
privacy as a status, with information being in either a secret private realm 
or an open public realm. 
In order to protect privacy in the Information Age, we must abandon 
the secrecy paradigm.  Privacy involves an expectation of a certain de-
gree of accessibility of information.  Under this alternative view, privacy 
entails control over and limitations on certain uses of information, even if 
the information is not concealed.  Privacy can be violated by altering lev-
els of accessibility, by taking obscure facts and making them widely ac-
cessible.  Our expectation of limits on the degree of accessibility emerges 
from the fact that information in public records has remained relatively 
inaccessible for much of our history.  When people lived in small towns 
and everybody knew each other’s business, there was no large-scale sys-
tem of record-keeping in place.  Today, people have a lot more anonym-
Amendment protection.”). 
 249. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).  This term, in Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court held that there are certain limits 
to how much technological enhancement of normal perception is permissible when it con-
cluded that thermal sensors violated the Fourth Amendment. 
 250. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage because trash collectors had access to it); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in pen register of phone numbers dialed from a person’s home telephone existed 
because the phone company could record this information); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (holding there is no reasonable expectation in financial records 
because banks had access to them). 
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ity in the sense that they often conduct many day-to-day activities among 
strangers.  The majority of Americans live in larger communities and 
frequently move to different places throughout their lifetimes.251  Ac-
cording to Janna Malamud Smith,  
Control over private behavior, previously in the hands of the family, the com-
munity or neighborhood, and the church, is now redistributed, with more power 
granted on the one hand to individuals, and on the other, at a greater distance, to 
the bureaucracies and institutions that attempt to keep track of vast numbers of 
mobile people . . . .252 
We know that our lives will remain private not in the sense that the 
information will be completely shielded from public access, but in the 
sense that for the most part, it will be lost in a sea of information about 
millions of people.  Our personal information remains private because it 
is a needle in a haystack, and usually nobody will take the time to try to 
find it.  This anonymity is rapidly disappearing as access to information 
is increasing. 
In limited contexts, some courts are beginning to abandon the se-
crecy paradigm, although most of privacy law still clings to it.  In United 
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press,253 the Court held that the release of FBI “rap sheets” was an inva-
sion of privacy within the privacy exemption of FOIA. The FBI rap 
sheets contained the  date of birth, physical description, and a history of 
arrests, charges, and convictions on over twenty-four million people.254  
FOIA exempts law enforcement records that “could reasonably be ex-
pected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”255  
The reporters claimed that the events summarized in the rap sheet were 
not private because they had previously been publicly disclosed.256  The 
Court rejected this argument: 
In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another di-
vulged to another.  Thus, the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at 
common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly pri-
vate fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private. . . . 
Recognition of this attribute of a privacy interest supports the distinction, in 
terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of information 
contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole . . . .257   
As the Court further remarked, “there is a vast difference between the 
public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse 
 251. About 75% of people live in cities or in suburbs to urban areas.  JANNA 
MALAMUD SMITH, PRIVATE MATTERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL LIFE 65 (1997). 
 252. Id.  
 253. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
 254. Id. at 751-52. 
 255. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000). 
 256. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762-63. 
 257. Id. at 763-64 (citations omitted). 
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files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country 
and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of infor-
mation.”258 
In cases involving the privacy torts,259 a few courts have recognized 
a privacy interest in information exposed to the public. For example, in 
Nader v. General Motors Corp.,260  Ralph Nader, a prominent public fig-
ure and outspoken critic of consumer safety, criticized the safety of Gen-
eral Motors’ automobiles for many years.261  General Motors, attempting 
to discredit Nader’s reputation, interviewed his friends and acquaintances 
to learn the private details of his life, kept him under surveillance, tapped 
his telephone and eavesdropped into his conversations, and hired prosti-
tutes to entrap him into an illicit relationship.262  Of particular relevance, 
General Motors hired a person to “shadow” Nader in public—to follow 
him around and watch him engage in day-to-day activities.263 The court 
held that generally observation in public did not constitute an action for 
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.264  This tort protects against the in-
tentional intrusion into one’s “solicitude or seclusion” or “his private af-
fairs or concerns” that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son.”265  Because the tort requires an invasion of “seclusion,” courts have 
typically rejected intrusion suits when plaintiffs have been in public 
places.266  Nevertheless, in Nader, the court concluded that “overzeal-
ous” watching such as “shadowing” could rise to a level as to constitute a 
violation of privacy (even though all the activities watched occurred in 
public).267 
Likewise, in cases involving the tort of public disclosure of private 
facts, a few courts have held that information once public can be private 
under certain circumstances.  The tort of public disclosure permits a per-
son to sue when one makes public “a matter concerning the private life of 
another” in a way that “(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
 258. Id. at 764. 
 259. The privacy torts are often referred to collectively as “invasion of privacy” and 
consist of (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light 
or “publicity”; and (4) appropriation.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).  
The torts were inspired by the famous article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis, 
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 260. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970). 
 261. Id. at 767. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 771. 
 264. Id. 
 265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 266. See, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482-83 (D. Me. 
1987) (holding that no intrusion occurred when photographers harassed and insulted the 
plaintiff in a public place). 
 267. Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 771.  
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son and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”268  In Daily Times 
Democrat v. Graham,269 a woman who went to a county fair had her 
dress inadvertently blown up by air jets on the platform she was standing 
on.270  A local newspaper photographer snapped a photo of the woman at 
that moment, and it was published on the front page of the newspaper.271  
The woman sued for a violation of the public disclosure tort.272 The 
newspaper argued that the picture was taken in public and therefore, she 
had no claim to privacy.273  The court, however, held that merely because 
a person is involuntarily placed in an embarrassing pose in public does 
not eliminate privacy.274 
In Melvin v. Reid,275 which is frequently referred to as “The Red 
Kimono” case, a former prostitute who was once criminally prosecuted 
for murder had left the prostitution business long ago and led a normal 
life.276  A motion picture company produced the film “The Red Ki-
mono,” depicting her life story and using her maiden name.277  She sued 
under the tort of public disclosure.278  The court held that, although she 
could not claim that the facts about her life were private because they 
were in the public record, there was no need for the movie to use her real 
name.279 
Likewise, in Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n,280 an article in 
Reader’s Digest Magazine about hijacking disclosed that the plaintiff had 
hijacked a truck.281  The crime occurred eleven years before the article; 
Briscoe had rehabilitated himself and his new friends, family, and young 
daughter were not aware of his previous life of crime.282  The court held 
that although the article was newsworthy and the facts of Briscoe’s crime 
could be disclosed, Briscoe could sue for the use of his name, which had 
no relevance to the article at all.283 
Generally, however, most courts still adhere to the secrecy paradigm 
 268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 269. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). 
 270. Id. at 476. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 475. 
 273. Id. at 477-78. 
 274. Id. at 478. 
 275. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). 
 276. Id. at 91. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 93. 
 280. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). 
 281. Id. at 36. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 39-40. 
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and do not recognize a privacy interest when information is exposed to 
the public.  As a result, most courts have rejected the Reid and Briscoe 
approach.284  In Forsher v. Bugliosi,285 the court noted that “California 
courts have refrained from extending the Briscoe rule to other fact situa-
tions.”286    The court considered Briscoe “an exception to the more gen-
eral rule that ‘once a man has become a public figure, or news, he re-
mains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his 
days.’”287  The Forsher decision was in line with the Restatement for the 
tort of public disclosure: “There is no liability when the defendant merely 
gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already 
public.  Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the 
plaintiff’s life which are matters of public record.”288  Likewise for the 
tort of intrusion upon seclusion, the Restatement provides that “there is 
no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plain-
tiff.”289  Further, Briscoe seems foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,290 which held that when infor-
mation is disclosed in documents open to the public, the press cannot be 
punished for publishing it.291 
In a number of cases, courts applying the constitutional right to in-
formation privacy have become mired in the secrecy paradigm.  Courts 
have refused to find a constitutional right to information privacy for data 
that has previously been disclosed or exist in a public record.  In Scheetz 
v. Morning Call, Inc.,292 a court held that a husband and wife had no con-
stitutional right to information privacy in a police report disclosed to the 
press containing the wife’s allegations of spousal abuse.293  Although her 
complaint to the police did not result in charges, “[t]he police could have 
brought charges without her concurrence, at which point all the informa-
tion would have wound up on the public record, where it would have 
been non-confidential.”294  In Cline v. Rogers,295 the court held that the 
 284. Westphal v. Lakeland Register, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2262, 2263 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
1977); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 431 (La. 1983); Montesano v. Donrey Media 
Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Nev. 1983); Jenkins v. Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992).  
 285. 608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980). 
 286. Id. at 726. 
 287. Id. (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 418 (1960)). 
 288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). 
 289. Id. § 652B cmt. c. 
 290. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 291. Id. at 495. 
 292. 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 293. Id. at 207. 
 294. Id. 
 295. 87 F.3d 176 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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constitutional right to information privacy did not apply to the disclosure 
of police records because “one’s criminal history is arguably not a private 
‘personal matter’ at all, since arrest and conviction information are mat-
ters of public record.”296  In Walls v. City of Petersburg,297 the court up-
held against a constitutional right to information privacy challenge a 
questionnaire asking public employees the criminal histories of their fam-
ily members, their complete marital history, including marriages, di-
vorces, and children, and any outstanding debts or judgments against 
them.298  The court reasoned that there was no privacy interest in this in-
formation because the data was already available in public records.299 
Courts have also adhered to the secrecy paradigm in challenges to 
Megan’s Laws, which mandate the disclosure of personal information 
about convicted sex offenders after they have completed their prison sen-
tences.  In Russell v. Gregoire,300 convicted sex offenders challenged 
Washington’s sex offender law, which provided for disclosure of their pic-
ture, name, age, date of birth, crimes, and vicinity of residence to govern-
ment agencies, schools, and even to the media in certain instances.301  The 
plaintiffs contended that Megan’s Law was unconstitutional under the con-
stitutional right to information privacy, but the court held that the informa-
tion was not private because it was “already fully available to the pub-
lic.”302 
In Paul P. v. Verniero,303 plaintiffs challenged New Jersey’s Megan’s 
Law.304  Disclosure would be to law enforcement officials, schools, and 
community organizations for certain offenders and disclosure to all mem-
bers of the public for the most severe offenders.305  The plaintiffs argued 
that the statutorily required disclosure of their names, physical descrip-
tions, and home addresses violated the constitutional right to information 
 296. Id. at 179; see also Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“[A]n individual cannot expect to have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in 
matters of public record.”). 
 297. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 298. Id. at 190-95.  Additionally, the questionnaire asked whether they had sexual re-
lations with a person of the same sex.  The court’s conclusion that no privacy interest ex-
isted for this information was based on a different rationale than the other questions.  The 
court concluded that under the “controlling” Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), there was no right to keep one’s sexual orientation private.  
Walls, 895 F.2d at 193.  It is unclear how Bowers controls on this proposition. 
 299. Walls, 895 F.2d at 193-94. 
 300. 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 301. Id. at 1082. 
 302. Id. at 1094. 
 303. 170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 304. Id. at 398. 
 305. Id. at 399. 
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privacy.306  The court explicitly rejected the logic of Reporter’s Commit-
tee, but recognized that the plaintiffs were entitled to privacy protection 
with regard to their address information.307 
In sum, courts are deeply divided about whether to adhere to the se-
crecy paradigm.  The Supreme Court clings to this paradigm in its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence but has abandoned it in its FOIA cases.308  
Courts applying privacy torts have occasionally departed from the para-
digm, but generally follow it.309  Unless the secrecy paradigm is aban-
doned, people will lose any ability to claim a privacy interest in the ex-
tensive personal information in public records. 
2. Aggregation: The Digital Biography 
Another longstanding notion of privacy is that it protects against 
disclosure of particularly sensitive or intimate information.  According to 
this view, information that we should protect as private must be embar-
rassing or harmful to one’s reputation.  However, the information in pub-
lic records often consists of fairly innocuous details—such as one’s birth 
date, address, height, weight, and so on.  Eugene Volokh epitomizes this 
view when he writes,  
[M]any of the proposals to restrict communication of consumer transactional 
data would apply far beyond a narrow core of highly private information, and 
would cover all transactional information, such as the car, house, food, or 
clothes one buys.  I don’t deny that many people may find such speech vaguely 
ominous and would rather that it not take place, and I acknowledge that some 
people get extremely upset about it. . . . If such relatively modest offense or an-
noyance is enough to justify speech restrictions, then the compelling interest bar 
has fallen quite low . . . .310 
A number of courts have rejected claims that certain information 
falls within state FOIA privacy exceptions because the information does 
not pose immediate harm to one’s reputation or security.  One court rea-
soned that “[n]ames and addresses are not ordinarily personal, intimate, 
or embarrassing pieces of information.”311  Another court held that pay-
 306. Id. at 398. 
 307. Id. at 400-01, 405.  But see Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (follow-
ing the conception from Reporters Committee when examining the constitutionality of 
Megan’s Law and noting that “a privacy interest is implicated when the government as-
sembles . . . diverse pieces of information into a single package and disseminates that 
package to the public, thereby ensuring that a person cannot assume anonymity”). 
 308. See supra notes 248-50, 253-58 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 260-308 and accompanying text. 
 310. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1117 (2000). 
 311. State Employees Ass’n v. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 615 
(Mich. 1987) (quoting Tobin v. Mich. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 331 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Mich. 
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roll records of the Philadelphia Police Department that contained each 
employee’s name, payroll number, gender, date of birth, annual salary, 
and other personal data were subject to disclosure because the records did 
not harm the officer’s reputation.312  Information about teacher salaries, 
according to one court, did not fall within the sunshine law privacy ex-
ception because “[t]he salaries of public employees and schoolteachers 
are not ‘intimate details . . . the disclosure of which might harm the indi-
vidual.’”313 
If the release of certain information in public records does not make 
one blush or reveal one’s deepest secrets, then what is the harm?  I con-
tend that the nature of the harm stems from what I call the “aggregation 
problem.” Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information 
is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait 
about our personalities.  The aggregation problem arises from the fact 
that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily amassed 
and combined.  Even information in public records that is superficial or 
incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals.  
Information breeds information.  For example, although one’s Social Se-
curity number does not in and of itself reveal much about an individual, it 
provides access to one’s financial information, educational records, 
medical records, and a whole host of other information. 
In a parable, The Circular Ruins, Jorge Luis Borges describes a per-
son who aspires to dream a man in “painstaking detail” so as to create an 
imaginary being so real that he can move from the world of dreams into 
the world of reality.314  The person begins by imagining the man’s heart 
and then adds details each night: 
  He dreamed the heart warm, active, secret—about the size of a closed fist, a 
garret-colored thing inside the dimness of a human body that was still faceless 
and sexless . . . . Each night he perceived it with greater clarity, greater cer-
tainty. . . . On the fourteenth night, he stroked the pulmonary artery with his 
forefinger, and then the entire heart, inside and out. . . . Before the year was out 
he had reached the skeleton, the eyelids.315 
Eventually, the person completes his goal and has assembled 
enough details to create a dreamed being so realistic that the being be-
1982)). 
 312. Moak v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 336 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). 
 313. Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 868 (N.H. 1972) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 1497, at 11 (1966)) (discussing federal FOIA); see also Pottle v. Sch. Comm. of 
Braintree, 482 N.E.2d 813, 816-17 (Mass. 1985) (holding that payroll records containing 
names, salaries, overtime pay, and addresses of policemen and school employees were not 
private within the meaning of Massachusetts’s FOIA privacy exception because the infor-
mation was not intimate). 
 314. JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Circular Ruins, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 96, 97 (An-
drew Hurley trans., 1998). 
 315. Id. at 98. 
 2002] ACCESS AND AGGREGATION 1181 
 
 
comes real.316  At the end of the parable, the dreamer realizes that he is 
but the dreamed person of another.317 
Borges’s parable illustrates the power of aggregating details.  In the 
Information Age, personal data is being combined to create a “digital bi-
ography” about us.  Information that appears innocuous can sometimes 
be the missing link, the critical detail in one’s digital biography, or the 
key necessary to unlock other stores of personal information.  There are 
several aspects of this digital biography that raise alarm. 
To the extent that the digital biography is accurate, our lives are not 
only revealed and recorded, but also can be analyzed and investigated.  
Our digital biographies are being assembled by companies like Choice-
Point, which are amassing personal information in public records along 
with other information.318  Collectively, millions of biographies can be 
searched, sorted, and analyzed in a matter of seconds.  This enables auto-
mated investigations of individuals on a nationwide scale by both the 
government and the private sector.  Increasingly, private sector entities 
are conducting investigations which can have profound consequences on 
people’s lives–such as their employment and financial condition.  Em-
ployers are resorting to information brokers of public record information 
to assist in screening job applicants and existing employees.  For exam-
ple, the firm HireCheck serves over 4000 employers to conduct back-
ground checks for new hires or current employees.319  It conducts a na-
tional search of outstanding warrants, a Social Security number search to 
locate age, past and current employers, and former addresses, a driver re-
cord search, a search of worker’s compensation claims “to avoid habitual 
claimants or to properly channel assignments,” a check of civil lawsuit 
records, as well as searches for many other types of information.320  
These investigations occur without any external oversight, and individu-
als often do not have an opportunity to challenge the results.321 
Although the digital biography contains a host of details about a 
person, it captures a distorted persona, one who is constructed by a vari-
ety of external details.  The digital biography falls short of the perfection 
achieved by the dreamer in Borges’s parable.  The problem, as Arthur 
Miller observed decades ago, is that an “individual who is asked to pro-
vide a simple item of information for what he believes to be a single pur-
 316. Id. at 99. 
 317. Id. at 100. 
 318. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68. 
 319. Hire Check, Welcome to Hirecheck, at http://www.hirecheck.com/ flashin-
tro/index.html (last viewed July 1, 2002). 
 320. Hire Check, Background Screening, at http://www.hirecheck.com/ Product-
sAndServices/background Screening.html (last viewed July 1, 2002).   
 321. Id. 
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pose may omit explanatory details that become crucial when his file is 
surveyed for unrelated purposes.”322  Further, although the data in public 
records combined with the information marketers glean about us can be 
quite revealing, it still cannot penetrate into our thoughts and often only 
partially captures who we are. W.H. Auden’s 1940 poem, The Unknown 
Citizen, depicts the situation with eerie foresight: 
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be 
One against whom there was no official complaint, 
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint, 
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community. 
Except for the War until the day he retired 
He worked in a factory and never got fired, 
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors, Inc. 
Yet he wasn’t a scab or odd in his views, 
For his Union reports that he paid his dues, 
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound) 
And our Social Psychology workers found 
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink. 
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day 
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way. 
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured, 
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured. 
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare 
He was fully sensible to the  advantages of the Instalment Plan 
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man, 
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire. 
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content 
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year; 
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, 
  he went. 
He was married and added five children to the population, 
Which our Eugenicist says was the right number for a parent of 
  his generation, 
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their education. 
Was he free?  Was he happy? The question is absurd: 
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.323 
 322. MILLER, supra note 52, at 34. 
 323. W.H. AUDEN, The Unknown Citizen, in COLLECTED POEMS 201 (Edward Men-
delson ed., 1976).   Used by permission of Random House, Inc.  Copyright 1940 and re-
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This poem aptly captures how day-to-day information both reveals 
and distorts.  Auden illustrates how our lives are captured to a significant 
degree by the information we leave behind.  Yet the information about 
our property, our professions, our purchases, our finances, and our medi-
cal history does not tell the whole story.  We are more than the bits of 
data we give off as we go about our lives. Our digital biography is reveal-
ing of ourselves but in a rather standardized way.  It consists of bits of 
information pre-defined based on the judgment of the government or 
some entity about what categories of information are relevant or impor-
tant.  We are partially captured by details such as our age, race, gender, 
net worth, property owned, and so on, but only in a manner that standard-
izes us into types or categories.  Indeed, database marketers frequently 
classify consumers into certain categories based on stereotypes about 
their values, their lifestyle, and their purchasing habits.324  Our digital bi-
ography is thus an unauthorized biography, only partially true and very 
reductive.  We must all live with such unauthorized biographies about us, 
the complete contents of which we often do not get to see.  Although cer-
tainly a more extensive dossier might be less reductive in capturing our 
personalities, it would have greater controlling effects on an individual’s 
life. 
Our digital biographies are not only reductive but are often inaccu-
rate.  In today’s bureaucratized world, one of the growing threats is that 
we will be subject to the inadvertence, carelessness, and mindlessness of 
bureaucracy.  A scene from the movie Brazil illustrates this problem by 
way of dark humor.325  The movie opens with an exhausted bureaucrat 
swatting a fly, which inconspicuously drops into a typewriter, causing a 
jam, and resulting in a mistyped letter in a person’s last name on a 
form.326  The paper is a form authorizing the arrest and interrogation of 
suspected rebels.  In the next scene, the innocent man whose name was 
wrongly typed on the form peacefully sits with his family when suddenly 
scores of armor-clad police storm into his tiny apartment and haul him 
away.327 
These dangers are not merely the imaginary stuff of movies.  The 
burgeoning use of databases of public record information by the private 
sector in screening job applicants and investigating existing employees 
demonstrates how errors can potentially destroy a person’s career.  Even 
before the ready accessibility of public records, significant problems 
newed 1968 by W.H. Auden.   
 324. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1424. 
 325. BRAZIL (Universal Pictures 1985). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
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emerged from the use of such information.  For example, in Paul v. 
Davis,328 the police distributed flyers with names and photographs to 
various stores erroneously listing the plaintiff as an active shoplifter.329  
The plaintiff almost lost his job and was afraid to enter stores.330  In a 
more recent example involving computerized information, a Maryland 
woman wrongly arrested for a burglary was not cleared from the state’s 
criminal databases.331 Her name and Social Security number also mi-
grated to a Baltimore County database relating to child protective ser-
vices cases.332  She was fired from her job as a substitute teacher, and 
only after she could establish that the information was in error was she 
rehired.333  When she later left that job to run a day care center for the 
United States’ military, she was subject to questioning about the errone-
ous arrest.334  Later on, when employed at as a child care director at a 
YMCA, she was terminated when her arrest record surfaced in a back-
ground clearance check; she could not have the error expunged in suffi-
cient time, so the job was given to another person.335  Only after several 
years was the error cleared from the public records.336  In another exam-
ple, as described earlier, the errors in the data supplied by ChoicePoint to 
the Florida elections officials possibly resulted in the loss of many peo-
ple’s right to vote.337 To the extent that our digital biographies are in-
creasingly relied upon to make important decisions, the problems that er-
rors can cause will only escalate in frequency and magnitude. 
Beyond these difficulties, our digital biographies greatly increase 
our vulnerability to a variety of dangers.  For example, a website called 
the “Nuremberg Files” posted information about doctors working in 
abortion clinics, including names, photos, Social Security numbers, home 
addresses, descriptions of their cars, and information about their fami-
lies.338  The website drew a black line through the names of murdered 
doctors and shaded wounded doctors’ names in gray.339  Fearing for their 
lives and the lives of their families, the doctors sued to shut the website 
down, but the Ninth Circuit held that the website had a First Amendment 
 328. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 329. Id. at 695. 
 330. Id. at 696-97. 
 331. Eugene L. Meyer, Md. Woman Caught in Wrong Net; Data Errors Link Her To 
Probes, Cost 3 Jobs, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at C1. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 338. See CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 42-43 (1999).   
 339. Id. at 43-44. 
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right to publish the information.340 The Nuremberg Files case illustrates 
the dangers created from the increased access to public record informa-
tion. 
As public record information becomes more readily available, 
criminals can use it to gain access to a person’s financial accounts.  For 
example, one industrious criminal gained access to the financial accounts 
of a number of individuals on Forbes Magazine’s list of the 400 richest 
people in America such as Oprah Winfrey and George Lucas.341  One of 
the most rapidly escalating forms of crime is identity theft.342  Identity 
theft occurs when an individual’s personal information is stolen to open 
new bank accounts, acquire credit cards, obtain loans, and so on.  In fact, 
the FBI stated that identity theft is the fastest-growing form of white-
collar criminal activity in the United States.343  Identity thieves fre-
quently obtain personal information necessary for their criminal activity 
through information brokers, who sell reports about individuals based on 
public record data combined with other information.344  Identity theft 
creates severe hardship for victims, who must spend countless hours—
estimated at about 175 hours over two years—to mend the damage to 
their credit.345 
Public record information also proves useful for stalkers.  In 1989, a 
fan obsessed with actress Rebecca Shaeffer located her home address 
with the help of a private investigator who obtained it from California 
 340. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1019-
20 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 341. Jayson Blair & William K. Rashbaum, Man Broke Into Accounts of Celebrities, 
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at B3. 
 342. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age: Rise of Online 
Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH. POST, May 31, 2001, at A1.  
According to estimates by the Federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, there are 
half a million victims of identity theft each year.  Id.  For a detailed discussion of identity 
theft, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001).  According to LoPucki, the problem of identity theft is not 
caused by the widespread accessibility of personal information but by the private sector’s 
use of Social Security numbers, addresses, and mothers’ maiden names as passwords.  See 
id. at 108-14.  Accordingly, LoPucki proposes a system where people publicly register 
their identities and provide data for identification.  See id. at 114-35.  I agree with LoPucki 
that restrictions must be placed on the way that the private sector maintains the security of 
personal information. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1460.  However, as described herein, 
there are other problems associated with the widespread disclosure of personal informa-
tion.  Even if LoPucki’s solution combats the identity theft problem, it can contribute to 
these other problems. 
 343. Jennifer S. Lee, Fighting Back When Someone Steals Your Name, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2001, § 3, at 8. 
 344. O’Harrow, supra note 342. 
 345. See Lee, supra note 343.  
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motor vehicles records.346  The fan murdered her outside her home.347  
This killing spurred Congress to pass the DPPA, which restricts the 
states’ ability to release motor vehicle records.348  Ironically, however, 
the Act provided an exception permitting the disclosure of personal in-
formation to private investigators without an individual’s consent.349 
At a more abstract level, the existence of digital biographies alters 
the nature of the society we live in.  In 1971, in his highly influential 
work on privacy, Arthur Miller warned of the “possibility of constructing 
a sophisticated data center capable of generating a comprehensive womb-
to-tomb dossier on every individual and transmitting it to a wide range of 
data users over a national network.”350  On a number of occasions, the 
federal government has flirted with the idea of creating a national data-
base of personal information.  The Johnson Administration contemplated 
creating a National Data Center that would combine information col-
lected by various federal agencies into one large computer database, but 
the plan was scrapped after a public outcry.351  Again, in the early 1970s, 
an official in the General Services Administration proposed that all of the 
federal government’s computer systems be connected in a network called 
FEDNET.352  Responding to a public outcry, Vice President Gerald Ford 
stopped the plan.353 
Although these proposals have been halted due to public outcries, 
we have been inching toward a system of de facto national identification 
for some time and are precariously close to having one.354 The Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 requires new employees to supply 
identification and proof of United States citizenship before obtaining a 
new job.355  In a recent effort to track down parents who fail to pay child 
support, the federal government has created a vast database consisting of 
 346. Lessley Anderson, Watching the I-Detectives, INDUS. STANDARD, Nov. 30, 
1998, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,2581, 00.html. 
 347. See id. 
 348. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 102. 
 349. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8) (2000). 
 350. MILLER, supra note 52, at 39. 
 351. See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 338, at 44.  In 1965, the Ruggles Committee issued a 
report urging that decentralized data among federal agencies be consolidated.  See SMITH, 
supra note 4, at 309  Due to a large public outcry, the proposal was abandoned.  See id. at 
310-11; see also Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data 
Center, 82 HARV. L. REV. 400, 404 (1968). 
 352. SMITH, supra note 4, at 311. 
 353. Id.  
 354. See Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Iden-
tification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 39 (2002).  See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, 
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999). 
 355. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 100 Stat. 3359 
(1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1365 (2000)). 
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information about all people who obtain a new job anywhere in the na-
tion. The database contains their Social Security numbers, addresses, and 
wages.356 The ready availability of one’s Social Security number and the 
ability to combine it with a host of other information about individuals 
will make increasingly more possible a reality where typing an individ-
ual’s name into a searchable database will pull up a “womb-to-tomb” 
dossier. 
Such a reality can pose significant dangers. “Identity systems and 
documents,” observes Richard Sobel, “have a long history of uses and 
abuses for social control and discrimination.”357  Slaves were required to 
carry identifying papers to travel; identification cards were used by the 
Nazis in locating Jews; and the slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda was aided 
by a system of identifiers.358  In addition to facilitating the monitoring 
and control of individuals, such a dossier may make a person a “prisoner 
of his recorded past.”359  Records of personal information can easily be 
used by government leaders and officials for improper monitoring of in-
dividuals.  Indeed, such data can be used for whatever task is at hand—a 
tool available to anyone in power in government for use to further the 
current passion or whim of the day.  In 1942, the Census Bureau used its 
data from the 1940 census to assist in the effort to intern Japanese-
Americans during World War II.360  Currently, we do not know the full 
consequences of living in a dossier society, but we are rapidly moving 
toward becoming such a society without sufficient foresight and prepara-
tion. 
The problems and dangers illustrated above are not merely the 
product of the actions of the government.  Rather, these troubles are 
caused by the way that both public and private sector entities are using 
personal information.  The issue concerns more than isolated threats and 
harms, but is fundamentally about the structure of our society.  Not only 
are public records altering the power that the government can exercise 
over people’s lives, but they are also contributing to the growing power 
of private sector entities. Elsewhere, I described the problem of private 
sector collection and use of personal information, and I argued that Franz 
Kafka’s The Trial is an appropriate metaphor to conceptualize this prob-
 356. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 
7, 8, 21, 25 & 42 U.S.C. (2000)).  See generally Robert O’ Harrow, Jr., Uncle Sam Has All 
Your Numbers, WASH. POST, June 27,1999 at A1. 
 357. Sobel, supra note 354, at 48. 
 358. See id. at 50-53. 
 359. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at 112.  
 360. See LARSON, supra note 50, at 53-54. 
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lem.361 In The Trial, a bureaucratic court system has assembled a dossier 
of information about the protagonist, Joseph K., and suddenly arrests him 
one morning.  K. is never informed of the reason for his arrest, and he 
embarks on a frustrating quest to find out why he has been arrested and 
the nature of the proceedings against him.  His information is in the 
hands of an entity that is obscure, unaccountable, and uncontrolled. 
Like The Trial, the current collection and use of personal informa-
tion are used to make decisions affecting an individual’s life, yet indi-
viduals often have no way to participate and no notice about what is hap-
pening.  Although people may be aware that dossiers are being 
assembled about them, they have no idea what information the dossiers 
contain or how the dossiers are being used.  For example, the HEW Re-
port in 1973 aptly observed 
There was a time when information about an individual tended to be elicited in 
face-to-face contacts involving personal trust and a certain symmetry, or bal-
ance, between giver and receiver.  Nowadays, an individual must increasingly 
give information about himself to large and relatively faceless institutions, for 
handling and use by strangers—unknown, unseen, and, all too frequently, unre-
sponsive.  Sometimes the individual does not even know that an organization 
maintains a record about him.  Often he may not see it, much less contest its ac-
curacy, control its dissemination, or challenge its use by others.362 
This reality creates a sense of unease, vulnerability, and powerless-
ness—a deepening sense that one is at the mercy of others, or, perhaps 
even more alarming, at the mercy of a bureaucratic process that is arbi-
trary, irresponsible, opaque, and indifferent to people’s dignity and wel-
fare. 
The problem with information collection and use today is not 
merely that individuals are no longer able to exercise control over their 
information; it is that their information is subjected to a bureaucratic pro-
cess that is itself out of control.363  Without this process being subject to 
regulation and control and without individuals having rights to exercise 
some dominion over their information, individuals will be routinely sub-
jected to the ills of bureaucracy. 
Public records contribute to this privacy problem because they are 
often a principal source of information for the private sector in the con-
struction of their databases.  Marketers stock their databases with public 
record information, and the uses to which these databases are put are 
manifold and potentially limitless.  The personal information in public 
records is often supplied involuntarily and typically for a purpose linked 
to the reason why particular records are kept.  The problem is that, often 
 361. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1419. 
 362. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at 29. 
 363. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1440. 
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without the individual’s knowledge or consent, the information is then 
used for a host of different purposes by both the government and busi-
nesses. 
Therefore, the privacy problem caused by public records concerns 
the structure of information flow—the way that information circulates 
throughout our society.  The problem is not necessarily the disclosure of 
secrets or the injury of reputations, but is one created by increased access 
and aggregation of data.  Privacy is an issue that concerns what type of 
society we want to construct for the future.  Do we want to live in a 
Kafkaesque world where dossiers about individuals circulate in an elabo-
rate underworld of public and private sector bureaucracies without the 
individual having notice, knowledge, or the ability to monitor or control 
the ways the information is used? 
C. TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY: RECONCILING THE TENSION 
How can the tension between transparency and privacy be recon-
ciled?  Must access to public records be sacrificed at the altar of privacy?  
Or must privacy evaporate in order for government to be disinfected by 
sunlight? 
It is my thesis that both transparency and privacy can be balanced 
through limitations on the access and use of personal information in pub-
lic records.  Of course, we must rethink what information belongs in pub-
lic records.  But we must also regulate the uses of our digital biographies.  
Government is not doing enough to protect against the uses of the infor-
mation that it routinely pumps into the public domain.  If we abandon the 
notion that privacy is an exclusive status, and recognize that information 
in public records can still remain private even if there is limited access to 
it, then a workable compromise for the tension between transparency and 
privacy emerges.  We can make information accessible for certain pur-
poses only.  When government discloses information, it can limit how it 
discloses that information by preventing it from being amassed by com-
panies for commercial purposes, to be sold to others, or to be combined 
with other information and sold back to the government. 
Much of the personal information in public records is not necessary 
to shed light on the way government carries out its functions.  Rather, 
this information reveals more about the people who are the subjects of 
the government’s regulatory machinery.  In the FOIA context, the Court 
has recognized that FOIA should not be interpreted beyond its purpose—
requiring disclosure for information that “would not shed any light on the 
conduct of any Government agency or official.”364  Nevertheless, al-
 364. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 773 (1989); see also Schwartz, supra note 152, at 594. 
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though the federal FOIA has served to shed light on government activi-
ties and has supplied critical information for hundreds of books and arti-
cles,365 it has also been used as a tool for commercial interests.  The vast 
majority of FOIA requests are made by businesses for commercial pur-
poses.366  According to Judge Patricia Wald, FOIA turns agencies into 
“information brokers” rather than “a window for public assessment of 
how government works.”367  When weighing interests under the privacy 
exceptions to the federal FOIA, although courts cannot consider the iden-
tity and purpose of the requester, they can take into account the relation-
ship of the requested document to the purposes of FOIA.368  Unlike the 
federal FOIA, many states routinely permit access by information bro-
kers without looking to the purposes of their sunshine laws or the public 
interest. 
State FOIAs generally do not permit any discrimination among re-
questers.  In a number of cases, states wanting to restrict access to people 
requesting records for commercial use had no statutory authority to do 
so.  In Dunhill v. Director, District of Columbia Department of Trans-
portation,369 a marketer of personal information about individuals sought 
a listing on computer tape of the names, addresses, birth dates, gender, 
and expiration date of drivers permits of all people holding valid District 
of Columbia drivers permits.370  The court held that the government had 
to release the information because the statute did not authorize the gov-
ernment to look to the motives of the request.371  In In re Crawford,372 a 
preparer of bankruptcy petitions for debtors challenged the requirement 
that he divulge his Social Security number on the petition, which would 
then be made public.  The court recognized that although the person had 
a privacy right in his Social Security number and that disclosure exposed 
him to dangers of fraud and identity theft, the interest in public access “is 
of special importance in the bankruptcy arena, as unrestricted access to 
 365. Cate et al., supra note 139, at 65. 
 366. See id. at 50-51 (citing studies by the General Accounting Office, Department of 
Health and Human Services, and the Department of Defense). 
 367. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the 
Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 667 (1984). 
 368. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178 (1991) (“The 
addition of the redacted identifying information would not shed any additional light on the 
Government’s conduct of its obligation.”); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (1989); see 
also Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 323  (5th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f disclosure of 
the requested information does not serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the 
activities of their government, disclosure will not be warranted even though the public 
may nonetheless prefer, albeit for other reasons, that the information be released.”). 
 369. 416 A.2d 244 (D.C. 1980). 
 370. Id. at 246. 
 371. Id. at 247-48. 
 372. 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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judicial records fosters confidence among creditors regarding the fairness 
of the bankruptcy system.”373  Thus, the court formalistically invoked the 
principle of transparency, relying on the vague argument that total trans-
parency fosters “confidence.” 
The danger with any principle is that it can drift to different uses 
over time.  J.M. Balkin explains this problem as “ideological drift.” 
“Ideological drift in law means that legal ideas and symbols will change 
their political valence as they are used over and over again in new con-
texts.”374 Laws fostering transparency are justified as shedding light into 
the dark labyrinths of government bureaucracy to expose its inner work-
ings to public scrutiny, and preventing the harrowing situation in Kafka’s 
The Trial—a bureaucracy that worked in clandestine and mysterious 
ways, completely unaccountable and unchecked.  These are certainly 
laudable goals, for they are essential to democracy and to the people’s 
ability to keep government under control.  However, sunshine laws are 
increasingly becoming a tool for powerful corporations to collect infor-
mation about individuals to further their own commercial interests, not to 
shed light on the government.  A window to look in on the government is 
transforming into a window for the government and allied private sector 
entities to peer in on individuals.  The data collected about individuals is 
then subject to a bureaucratic process that is often careless, uncontrolled, 
and clandestine. Because private sector bureaucracies lack the transpar-
ency of those of government, there is a greater potential for personal in-
formation to be abused.  Paradoxically, a right of access designed to em-
power individuals and protect them from the ills of bureaucracy can lead 
to exactly the opposite result. 
There are certainly instances where information about individuals 
can provide illumination on the way that the government is functioning.  
The examination of accident reports may reveal useful information about 
widespread problems with particular vehicles.  Scrutiny of police records 
may indicate problems in police investigation and enforcement.  Informa-
tion about the salaries of public school teachers and other public officials 
and employees may enable the public to assess whether such officials and 
employees are being over- or under-compensated.  Disciplinary informa-
tion about such employees can allow taxpayers to assess the performance 
of those who are earning their tax dollars.  However, many of these pur-
poses can be achieved through evaluating aggregate statistical data or by 
examining records with redacted personal identifying information. 
The solution is not to eliminate all access to public records, but to 
 373. Id. at 960. 
 374. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 
869, 871 (1993). 
 1192 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:1137 
 
 
redact personal information where possible and to regulate specific uses 
of information. Real property information must be made available for 
certain purposes, but it should not be available for all purposes. It is nec-
essary for a litigant to obtain the address of a celebrity the litigant desires 
to sue in order to serve process; however, to disclose the address to fans 
or to publish it on the Internet is different. 
Use restriction laws, such as those discussed above in Part I.B, are a 
step in the right direction.  These laws attempt to navigate the tension be-
tween transparency and privacy by permitting the use of public record 
information for certain purposes but not all purposes. One of the long-
standing Fair Information Practices is purpose specification—that per-
sonal information obtained for one purpose cannot be used for another 
purpose without an individual’s consent.375  Often the purposes for the 
government collection of personal information vary widely from the pur-
poses for which they are used after they are disclosed in public records.  
Governments collecting personal information should limit such uncon-
trolled drift in use. Access should be granted for uses furthering tradi-
tional functions of transparency such as the watchdog function; access 
should be denied for commercial solicitation uses because such uses do 
not adequately serve the functions of transparency.  Rather, such uses 
make public records a cheap marketing tool, resulting in the further 
spread of personal information, which is often resold among marketers. 
Use restriction laws must go beyond basic restrictions on access for 
commercial solicitation.  The use of public records by information bro-
kers or other entities that aggregate personal information and sell it to 
others is deeply problematic for the reasons discussed earlier in this Part.  
Although information brokers have brought a new level of accessibility 
to public records by combining them together in gigantic databases avail-
able online, they have also contributed greatly to the creation of the digi-
tal biography. This type of aggregated public record information is often 
not used for the purposes of checking governmental abuse or monitoring 
governmental activities.  Rather, it is used to investigate individuals.  
This investigation is at the behest of other individuals, private detectives, 
employers, and law enforcement officials. Information brokers such as 
ChoicePoint collect public record information and supplement it with a 
host of other personal information, creating a convenient investigation 
 375. See HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at viii.  The Fair Information Practices 
were developed by the United Stated Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW) in 1973, and they consist of a number of principles for the use and processing of 
personal information.  The Fair Information Practices have proven to be highly influential 
in United States law as well as throughout the world.  See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Informa-
tion Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 44, at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLE_index.htm. 
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tool for government entities.  The use of information brokers by the gov-
ernment to investigate citizens runs directly counter to the spirit of free-
dom of information laws, which were designed to empower individuals 
to monitor their government, not vice versa. 
Certain information should be restricted from public records com-
pletely.  The Administrative Office proposal to separate both paper and 
electronic documents into a public and private file for civil cases and to 
restrict access to certain documents in criminal proceedings such as pre-
sentence reports  is a step in the right direction.376  One example of in-
formation that should be excluded from public records is a person’s So-
cial Security number.  Social Security numbers serve as a gateway to 
highly sensitive information such as financial accounts, school records, 
and a host of other data.  Social Security numbers are very difficult to re-
place if they fall into the hands of an identity thief.  As a routine practice, 
Social Security numbers should automatically be redacted from every 
document before being disclosed publicly. 
Jurors, parties to litigation, and witnesses should all be informed of 
the extent to which their personal information could become a public re-
cord and must be given an opportunity to voice their privacy concerns 
and have information redacted. 
The federal Privacy Act must be amended to provide more meaning-
ful protection.  Its restrictions on the use of Social Security numbers must 
be strengthened to regulate and restrict the use of Social Security num-
bers by the private sector.  Further, the Privacy Act should contain mean-
ingful remedies for violations and the “routine use” exception must be 
significantly tightened. 
Finally, more laws like the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act are nec-
essary to nationalize public records law.  We are becoming an informa-
tion society where information is no longer localized.  People frequently 
move from state to state and often do not live where they were born or 
grew up.  We need a strong national information policy rather than the 
widely differing state public record regimes.  This is the most efficient 
and effective means to govern information flow in the United  States.  A 
uniform baseline provides a good way to ensure privacy, for all citizens 
to know about their privacy rights in public record information, and for 
all users of information to know their responsibilities. 
Therefore, a federal baseline should be established to govern public 
records in all states.  This law should not preempt states from adopting 
stricter protections of privacy, but it must provide a meaningful floor of 
 376. Judicial Conference, Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to 
Electronic Case Files (Sept. 26, 2001), available at http:// www.privacy.uscourts.gov/ 
RFC.htm. 
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protection.  Although each state should adopt its own statute akin to the 
federal Privacy Act, one option would be to extend the federal Privacy 
Act to the states. 
We may never be able to achieve complete secrecy of information in 
many situations and, in some situations, complete secrecy would be un-
desirable.  We can, however, limit accessibility and use. The next Part 
examines to what extent the Constitution might limit this approach. 
III.  PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE CONSTITUTION   
In this Part, I examine whether the access and use restrictions I ad-
vocated in Part II can pass muster under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Understood broadly, the First Amendment 
protects openness in information flow.  First, the Court and lower courts 
have held that the First Amendment provides certain rights of access to at 
least some government proceedings and records. Restrictions on the in-
formation available in public records might infringe upon this right.  
Second, freedom of speech and the press prevent the government from 
restricting the disclosure and dissemination of information. A close 
analysis of the Court’s decisions, however, reveals that access and use 
restrictions are constitutional. 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ACCESS 
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the First 
Amendment mandates that certain government proceedings be open to 
the public.  In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,377 a plurality of 
the Court concluded that the First Amendment provided the public with a 
right of access to criminal trials.378 Although seven Justices agreed that 
the First Amendment provides a right of access to trials, no rationale 
achieved a majority. 
Two years later, the Court coalesced around an approach in Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.379  There, a Massachusetts law man-
dated that criminal trials be closed in all cases where juvenile victims of 
sexual assault testified to protect their privacy.380  The Court struck down 
the law, reasoning that a “major purpose” of the First Amendment is “to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”381 The Court articu-
lated a two-prong test to determine whether the right to access applies, 
first looking to whether the proceeding “historically has been open to the 
 377. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 378. Id. at 575-78. 
 379. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 380. Id. at 623. 
 381. Id. at 604 (citation omitted). 
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press and general public” and then examining whether access “plays a 
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and 
the government as a whole.”382  According to the Court, “public access to 
criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check 
upon the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of 
self-government.”383 The Court recognized that the right to access crimi-
nal trials is not absolute.  A state can deny access to criminal proceedings 
if “the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and 
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”384  Although the state interest 
to protect juvenile sexual assault victims was compelling, the Court con-
cluded that the mandatory rule requiring closure in all cases was too 
broad.385 
Shortly after Globe, the Court resolved that the right to access ex-
tends beyond the immediate criminal trial to jury selection.  In Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I),386 a trial for capi-
tal murder, the trial court severely restricted public access to the ques-
tioning of prospective jurors.  Press-Enterprise moved for a release of the 
complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings, but the trial court re-
fused because of concern for juror privacy since certain sensitive matters 
were discussed.387  The Court held that there is a public interest in ensur-
ing that jurors are “fairly and openly selected,”388  and concluded that the 
trial court too broadly closed off access and failed to consider alternatives 
that were available to protect the jurors’ privacy.389 
The Court extended the right to access to pretrial proceedings in 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II).390 The 
Court reasoned that historical practice in the United States had been “to 
conduct preliminary hearings in open court”391 and that public access to 
preliminary hearings served as an important “safeguard against the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or ec-
centric judge.”392 
Lower courts determining the applicability of the First Amendment 
right to access apply the two-prong test of Globe Newspaper and the 
 382. Id. at 605-06. 
 383. Id. at 606. 
 384. Id. at 607. 
 385. See id. at 607-08. 
 386. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
 387. Id. at 504. 
 388. Id. at 509. 
 389. Id. at 512. 
 390. 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 391. Id. at 10. 
 392. Id. at 12-13 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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Press-Enterprise cases.  Following the lead of the Supreme Court, lower 
courts have proclaimed that the right to access to criminal proceedings 
applies not only to trials, pretrial proceedings, and jury selection, but also 
to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings,393 as well 
as bail hearings.394 
Although the Court has never squarely addressed whether the right 
of access applies beyond criminal proceedings, several lower courts have 
extended it to civil cases.  For example, in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. 
Cohen,395 the court reasoned that there was a long tradition for open civil 
trials and that “the civil trial, like the criminal trial, plays a particularly 
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the govern-
ment as a whole.”396  Further, although no Supreme Court case directly 
addresses whether the First Amendment requires access to court docu-
ments, several courts “have concluded that the logic of Press-Enterprise 
II extends to at least some categories of court documents and records.”397  
Not all courts agree, however.398 
Courts have rarely applied the First Amendment right to access be-
yond court records to other public records.  The rationale for the right to 
access turns on the need for knowledge about the government as an es-
sential component of discourse about the government.  Although the 
Court’s cases involve judicial proceedings, the rationale can be logically 
extended beyond such proceedings.  Therefore, even if a state did not 
have a sunshine law or a common law right of access, the Constitution 
might be interpreted to require a degree of openness. 
Nevertheless, even under an expansive view, the right to access does 
not apply to efforts to restrict the access to personal information for par-
ticular uses.  When public records illuminate government functioning, 
access to government records is generally consistent with the rationale 
for the First Amendment right to access.  However, the grand purposes 
behind the right to access are simply not present in the context of much 
information gathering from public records today.  As discussed in Part II, 
 393. See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 394. See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 395. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 396. Id. at 1070 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 397. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997);  see also Little-
john v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Access means more than the ability 
to attend open court proceedings; it encompasses the right of the public to inspect and to 
copy judicial records.”); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 
1145 (4th Cir. 1984) (“There is no reason to distinguish between pretrial proceedings and 
the documents filed in regard to them.”). 
 398. Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(“[T]here is no general First Amendment right in the public to access criminal justice re-
cords.”). 
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public records are becoming a tool for powerful private sector interests to 
use in furtherance of commercial gain.  These uses engender significant 
threats to individuals and to the structure of our society, and they do not 
shed light on the government. 
In fact, the Constitution does not simply require open information 
flow; it also establishes certain responsibilities for the way that the gov-
ernment uses the information it collects. The Court has held that there are 
circumstances where the government cannot force individuals to disclose 
personal information absent a compelling government interest.  In 
NAACP v. Alabama,399 the Court struck down a state statute requiring the 
NAACP to disclose a list of the names and addresses of its members.  
The Court observed that there is a “vital relationship between freedom to 
associate and privacy in one’s associations.”400  Noting that revelation of 
membership in the NAACP exposed members to potential economic re-
prisal and physical violence, the Court declared that “[i]nviolability of 
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensa-
ble to preservation of freedom of association.”401 NAACP v. Alabama 
suggests that the government cannot expose citizens to the potential per-
ils that public disclosure may bring.  Reasoning in a similar fashion, in 
Greidinger v. Davis,402 the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s voter reg-
istration system, which required voters to provide their Social Security 
numbers (which were then made publicly available), was unconstitutional 
because it forced people to risk public disclosure of their Social Security 
numbers in order to vote.403  These cases can be read to establish the im-
portant principle that the fear of disclosure of personal information col-
lected by the government is a recognized injury, one that can interfere 
with the exercise of fundamental rights. 
Further, under the constitutional right to privacy, the Court has held 
that government has a duty to protect privacy when it collects personal 
data.  In 1977, the Court addressed whether the right to privacy estab-
lished in Griswold v. Connecticut,404 Eisenstadt v. Baird,405 and Roe v. 
Wade406  extended to issues involving information as opposed to deci-
sions about one’s body, sexual conduct, or health.  In the landmark case 
Whalen v. Roe,407 the Court held that the right to privacy encompassed 
 399. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 400. Id. at 462. 
 401. Id. 
 402. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 403. Id. at 1354. 
 404. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 405. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 406. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 407. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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the protection of personal information.  At issue in Whalen was a record-
keeping system of people who obtained prescriptions for certain addic-
tive medications.408  The plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed upon 
their right to privacy.409  The Court proclaimed that the constitutionally 
protected “zone of privacy” extends to two distinct types of interests: (1) 
decisional privacy, which the Court defined as “independence in making 
certain kinds of important decisions”; and (2) information privacy, which 
the Court defined as the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”410  The Court concluded, 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive 
government files. . . .  The right to collect and use such data for public purposes 
is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures. . . . [I]n some circumstances that duty arguably has its 
roots in the Constitution . . . . 411 
Whalen recognized that when the government collected personal in-
formation, it took on a responsibility to keep it secure and avoid disclos-
ing it to others.412   
Since its creation in Whalen, the constitutional right to information 
privacy has begun to evolve in the courts.413  The full extent of the gov-
 408. Such medications included opium, cocaine, methadone, and amphetamines which 
were used in  treating epilepsy, narcolepsy, migraine headaches, and certain psychological 
disorders.  See id. at 593 n.8. 
 409. Id. at 598. 
 410. Id. at 599-600. 
 411. Id. at 605. 
 412. The Court reiterated this notion of constitutional protection for information pri-
vacy in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977), concluding 
that President Nixon had a constitutional privacy interest in records of his private commu-
nications with his family.  Id. 
 413. After Whalen and Nixon, the Court has done little to develop the right of informa-
tion privacy.  As one court observed, the right “has been infrequently examined; as a result its 
contours remain less than clear.”  Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1988).  The 
scope and existence of the constitutional right to information privacy remains in dispute 
among lower courts. A majority of the circuit courts has accepted the constitutional right to 
information privacy.  See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999); Walls v. 
City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Barry v. City of New York, 712 
F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 
577 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).   One 
circuit court has expressed “grave doubts” as to the existence of the right, stopping short of 
confronting the issue of whether the right existed. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Dep’t 
of Housing & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 788, 791-92 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit 
recognizes the right, but only as a narrow corollary to the decisional privacy cases, pertain-
ing to personal information relating to one’s health, family, children, and other interests 
protected by the Court’s substantive due process right to privacy decisions.  J.P. v. De-
Santi, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981).  To date, only a handful of law review articles 
and notes have discussed the constitutional right to information privacy in great depth.  
See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerg-
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ernment’s information handling obligations awaits further development.  
It remains undetermined whether these obligations extend to measures 
beyond non-disclosure, such as the security of information, limited use, 
purpose specification, and other Fair Information Practices. 
Nevertheless, taken together, the Court’s jurisprudence in the con-
texts of free association and the constitutional right to information pri-
vacy suggests that the Constitution does not merely mandate public ac-
cess to information but also obligates the government to refrain from 
disclosing personal information. 
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 
The First Amendment more directly fosters information flow about 
government activities by forbidding restrictions on freedom of speech 
and the press.  These freedoms extend beyond disclosure about govern-
ment to almost all forms of discourse, including speech about private 
citizens. 
Understanding how use and access restrictions on public record in-
formation interact with the First Amendment requires a difficult naviga-
tion between two lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Under one line 
of cases—Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn Publishing Co.,414 Oklahoma 
Publishing Co. v. District Court In and For Oklahoma County,415 Smith 
v. Daily Mail,416 and Florida Star v. B.J.F.417 —the Court has held that 
when the government makes information publicly available in a public 
record, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.418  In Los Ange-
les Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Co.,419 however, 
the Court concluded that the government may selectively grant access to 
public record information.420  In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,421 the 
Court stated that the government may condition the receipt of discovery 
information on nondisclosure,422 a conclusion that is supported by the 
Court’s extensive unconstitutional condition jurisprudence. I will attempt 
to navigate these choppy waters of Supreme Court free speech jurispru-
ing Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
479 (1990); Bruce W. Clark, Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 133 (1982); Gary R. Clouse, Comment, The Constitutional Right to With-
hold Private Information, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 536 (1982). 
 414. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 415. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). 
 416. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
 417. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 418. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 538. 
 419. 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
 420. Id. at 40-41. 
 421. 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
 422. Id. at 33-34. 
 1200 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:1137 
 
 
dence to assess how the Court would (and should) analyze the types of 
use and access restrictions I suggested in Part II. 
In a series of cases, the Court has struck down a number of statutes 
prohibiting the disclosure of information gleaned from public records.  In 
Cox Broadcasting Corp.,423 the Court held that a state could not impose 
civil liability based upon publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from 
a court record.424  The Court pronounced that “[o]nce true information is 
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press 
cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”425  In justifying the rule, the 
Court concluded that not only does the ability to report on the criminal 
justice system provide greater transparency in government, but that the 
fact that the information was in a public record reduced the plaintiff’s 
privacy interest.426  “[T]he interests in privacy fade when the information 
involved already appears on the public record.”427  Punishing the press 
for publishing public record information would “invite timidity and self-
censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items that 
would otherwise be published and that should be made available to the 
public.”428  If states wish to protect privacy, they “must respond by 
means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private 
information.”429 
After Cox Broadcasting Corp., in Oklahoma Publishing Co.,430 the 
Supreme Court held that a state court could not prohibit the media from 
disclosing the name and photograph of an eleven-year-old boy when the 
media had gleaned that information by attending a juvenile proceed-
ing.431  In Smith432  the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the publi-
cation of the names of juvenile offenders: “[I]f a newspaper lawfully ob-
tains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state 
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, 
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”433 
This line of cases culminated in Florida Star,434 in which a newspa-
per published the name of a rape victim, which it obtained in a publicly 
 423. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 424. Id. at 496-97. 
 425. Id. at 496. 
 426. Id. at 494-95. 
 427. Id.   
 428. Id. at 496. 
 429. Id. 
 430. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). 
 431. Id. at 311-12. 
 432. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
 433. Id. at 103. 
 434. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
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released police report.  The report was in a room with signs indicating 
that the names of rape victims were not part of the public record and 
were not to be published.435  The reporter even admitted that she knew 
she was not allowed to report on the information.436 The victim’s fellow 
workers and friends read the article; her mother received threatening 
phone calls from a man who stated he would rape the woman again; and 
these events caused her to change her phone number and residence, seek 
police protection, and obtain mental health counseling.437  Under a Flor-
ida law prohibiting the mass communication of the names of rape vic-
tims, the paper was found civilly liable.438 The Court, however, held that 
the Florida law ran afoul of the First Amendment.  “We hold only that 
where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully 
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when nar-
rowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order . . . .”439 
Taken together, these cases support the premise that once the gov-
ernment makes information public, the government cannot subsequently 
sanction its further disclosure.  In Cox, however, the Court noted that it 
was not reaching “any constitutional questions which might arise from a 
state policy not allowing access by the public and press to various kinds of 
official records.”440 
The Court addressed this issue in United Reporting Publishing 
Corp.441 when it  examined the constitutionality of California’s access 
restriction law for arrestee information.442  The law required those seek-
ing access to the information to execute a declaration under penalty of 
perjury that address information “shall not be used directly or indirectly 
to sell a product or service to any individual or group of individuals.”443  
Rejecting a facial challenge that the law infringed upon commercial 
speech, the Court reasoned that the statute was not “prohibiting a speaker 
from conveying information that the speaker already possesses” but was 
merely “a governmental denial of access to information in its possession” 
under which it had no duty to disclose.444  As long as the government is 
not under a duty to provide access to information, it can selectively de-
 435. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting). 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. at 528. 
 438. Id. at 526. 
 439. Id. at 541. 
 440. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496 n.26 (1975). 
 441. 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999). 
 442. Id. at 34. 
 443. CAL. GOV’T  CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999). 
 444. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. at 40. 
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termine who shall have access to it.445  The Court also held in Houchins v. 
KQED Inc.446 that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or 
sources of information within the government’s control.”447 
In addition to the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court’s “un-
constitutional condition” jurisprudence lends further support for the gov-
ernment’s ability to condition access to public records.448  A series of 
cases establishes the limits of what access conditions are permissible.  
According to the doctrine, originating during the Lochner era, “govern-
ment may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surren-
der a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that 
benefit altogether.”449  Kathleen Sullivan aptly characterizes the doctrine 
as “riven with inconsistencies.”450 
In several cases decided during the 1950s and 1960s, the Court in-
validated several conditions requiring that recipients of the government’s 
largesse surrender constitutional rights.  In Speiser v. Randall,451 the 
Court held that war vetarans could not be required to take a loyalty oath 
in order to receive a property tax exemption because it “will have the ef-
 445. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, the Court held that a party obtaining access to 
information via discovery could be restricted from disclosing that information through a 
protective order.  467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).  A newspaper challenged a protective order on 
First Amendment grounds, but the Court upheld the order, noting that the broad discovery 
rules permit parties to obtain information “that not only is irrelevant but if publicly re-
leased could be damaging to reputation and privacy.” Id. at 35.  Therefore, the Court held 
that when a “protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemi-
nation of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 37 (citation omitted). 
 446. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 447. Id. at 15.  In a series of cases, the Court has held that outside of the First 
Amendment right of access, freedom of the press does not require that the press be given 
any special rights to acquire information from the government.  See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (“The First Amendment generally grants 
the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public.); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (The Constitution does not . . . require government to 
accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public gener-
all) (citation omitted); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“The right to speak and pub-
lish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”).  Additionally, the 
Court held that the First Amendment cannot foreclose a lawsuit by a confidential source to 
enforce a newspaper’s promise of confidentiality because the press “has no special immu-
nity from the application of general laws. . . . [and] no special privilege to invade the rights 
and liberties of others.” Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting 
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-22 (1937)). 
 448. Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1418 
(1989). 
 449. Id. at 1415. 
 450. Id. at 1416. 
 451. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
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fect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech.”452  
Sherbert v. Verner453 struck down the denial of state unemployment 
benefits to a person who refused to work on Saturday for religious rea-
sons because it “forces her to choose between following the precepts of 
her religion and forfeiting benefits.”454  Furthermore,  in Shapiro v. 
Thompson,455 the Court held unconstitutional the denial of welfare bene-
fits to people who had recently moved into a state because it chilled the 
right to interstate travel.456 
Cases decided after the mid-1970s, however, are very inconsistent.  
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,457 the Internal 
Revenue Code provided a tax benefit to veterans’ lobbying groups but 
not other charities.458  The Court applied minimal scrutiny because Con-
gress was not required to provide any tax advantage for lobbying.459  The 
government was simply selecting “particular entities or persons for enti-
tlement.”460 
A year later in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,461 the 
Court applied heightened scrutiny to strike down a condition that feder-
ally-funded broadcasting stations refrain from editorializing in order to 
receive funding from the government.462  Similarly, in Arkansas Writers’ 
Project, Inc. v. Ragland,463 the Court struck down a state sales tax that 
excluded certain types of magazines (religious, professional, trade, and 
sports) but not others.464 
Returning to its permissive view of conditional funding, the Court in 
Lyng v. International Union465 upheld a statute making households ineli-
gible for food stamps if any member of that household was on strike: 
“[E]ven where the Constitution prohibits coercive governmental interfer-
ence with specific individual rights, it does not confer an entitlement to 
such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that free-
dom.”466  Likewise, the Court reasoned in Maher v. Roe467 that the gov-
 452. Id. at 519. 
 453. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 454. Id. at 404. 
 455. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 456. See id. at 634. 
 457. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 458. Id. at 542. 
 459. See id. at 549-50. 
 460. Id. at 549. 
 461. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
 462. Id. at 402. 
 463. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
 464. Id. at 233. 
 465. 485 U.S. 360 (1988). 
 466. Id. at 369 (internal quotations omitted). 
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ernment can selectively provide funds for normal childbirth without hav-
ing also to fund abortions.468 
Today, the leading case on the subject is Rust v. Sullivan,469 in 
which Congress prohibited workers in federally funded family planning 
services from engaging in counseling advocating abortion as a method of 
family planning.470  Rejecting a First Amendment challenge, the Court 
concluded that 
[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a pro-
gram to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, with-
out at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the 
problem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on 
the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion 
of the other . . . .471 
As these cases indicate, the government retains significant discretion 
in how it chooses to distribute its largesse.  Public record information is 
part of this largesse, and the most recently decided unconstitutional condi-
tion cases suggest that the government can impose certain conditions on 
how this information is used before it grants access. 
The Court’s jurisprudence thus creates a distinction between pre-
access conditions on obtaining information and post-access restrictions on 
the use or disclosure of the information.  If the government is not obligated 
to provide access to certain information by the First Amendment, it can 
amend its sunshine laws to establish pre-access conditions, restricting ac-
cess for certain kinds of uses.  Governments can make a public record 
available on the condition that certain information is not disclosed or used 
in a certain manner.  However, governments cannot establish post-access 
restrictions on the disclosure or use of information that is publicly avail-
able.472  Once the information is made available to the public, the Florida 
Star case prohibits a state from restricting use.473 
One could certainly argue that the Court’s distinction between pre-
access and post-access restrictions seems rather tenuous.  States can ac-
complish the same restrictions on disclosure of public information that the 
Court struck down in Florida Star with a simple redrafting of their statutes.  
In Florida Star, Florida could have easily rewritten its law to make rape 
victims’ names available on the condition that the press promise they not 
 467. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 468. Id. at 479. 
 469. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 470. Id. at  202-03. 
 471. Id. at 193. 
 472. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 523 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 473. 491 U.S. at 524 (1989); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 
435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (holding that a state could not criminalize a newspaper’s disclo-
sure of leaked information about a judicial disciplinary proceeding). 
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be disclosed.  Those seeking access could be required to sign a declaration 
that the information would not be disclosed or used for certain purposes.  
Conditional access and use restrictions thus appear to be an end-run around 
Florida Star.  Can the Court’s distinction between pre- and post-access re-
strictions be defended? 
Certain language in Florida Star suggests that the case turns on the 
government’s unclean hands, as the Court emphasizes the government’s 
failure “to police itself in disseminating information.”474 “[W]here the 
government has made certain information publicly available,” the Court 
observed, “it is highly anomalous to sanction persons other than the 
source of its release.”475  Acting hypocritically by disclosing information 
and then punishing the press for the same offense, the state cannot give the 
press the forbidden fruit and ask the press not to eat it.  Moreover, the Flor-
ida statute had no scienter requirement; it imposed liability regardless of 
whether the rape victim’s name was already known throughout the com-
munity.476 
This distinction between post- versus pre-access conditions can be de-
fended as a protection against the chilling effects caused by uncertainty 
over the public record information that can be disclosed.  According to Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. and Florida Star, one should not have to act at her 
peril whenever she discloses information obtained from a public record.  
By making access conditional on a promise not to disclose or restricting 
access in certain cases, however, there is a clear notice to the recipient as to 
her obligations and responsibilities in handling that information. 
Without a distinction between post- and pre-access conditions, the 
government would be forced into an all-or-nothing tradeoff between trans-
parency and privacy.  The government could make records public, allow-
ing all uses of the personal information contained therein, or the govern-
ment could simply make records unavailable to the public for any purpose.  
However, by making access conditional on accepting certain responsibili-
ties when using data—such as using it for specific purposes, not disclosing 
it to others, and so on, certain functions of transparency can be preserved at 
the same time privacy is protected. 
Has the Court too quickly dispatched with the free speech implica-
tions of conditional or limited access regulation?  Do restrictions on 
commercial access, for example, constitute  unconstitutional  content-
based restrictions on free speech because they single out specific mes-
sages and viewpoints—namely, commercial ones? Prior to United Re-
 474. 491 U.S. at 538. 
 475. Id. at 535. 
 476. Id. at 539. 
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porting Publishing, courts were divided on the issue.477  Although com-
mercial speech was originally not considered to fall within the domain of 
the First Amendment,478 in 1976, the Court recognized a limited First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech.479  Typically, a content-
based restriction on regular speech is reviewed under strict scrutiny, the 
most stringent form of constitutional scrutiny.480  Content-based restric-
tions on commercial speech, however, are reviewed under a form of in-
termediate scrutiny.  Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of N.Y.481 sets forth the current test for analyzing re-
strictions on commercial speech.482 Courts are to first examine whether 
commercial speech is misleading or involves illegal activity; if so, it is 
not protected.483  If, however, the speech is not illegal or deceptive, then 
it is protected by intermediate scrutiny.484  The government interest must 
be substantial; the regulation must directly advance the government in-
terest; finally, the regulation must be appropriately tailored to advance 
the government interest (i.e., be no more extensive than necessary).485 
The issue, then, is whether access restrictions are subject to no First 
Amendment protection (except where barred by the First Amendment 
right to access) or whether they implicate speech and are subject to in-
termediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.  Dissenting in United Report-
ing Publishing Corp., Justice Stevens argued that the California access 
and use restriction improperly singled out “a narrow category of persons 
 477. Compare Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 1999), vacated and 
remanded by McClure v. Amelkin, 528 U.S. 1059 (striking down an access restriction 
statute), and Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that an access restric-
tion statute implicated First Amendment), and Babkes v. Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 912-13 
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (striking down an access restriction statute), with Lanphere & Urbaniak v. 
Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding Colorado access restriction to 
arrestee records), Fed. Election Comm’n v. Int’l Funding Inst., Inc., 969 F.2d 1110, 1117-
18 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding the Federal Election Campaign Act’s making political 
committee contributor lists available for public inspection with the limitation that any in-
formation copied may not be sold or used for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for 
commercial purposes because there was no pre-existing right to have access to such lists), 
and DeSalvo v. State, 624 So. 2d 897, 901 (La. 1993) (upholding access restriction stat-
ute), and Walker v. S. C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346, 348 (S.C. 
1995) (holding that vehicle report access restriction “regulates only access to informa-
tion”).  
 478. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 479. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
770 (1976). 
 480. See Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 461 (1996). 
 481. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 482. Id. at 574. 
 483. Id. at 563-64. 
 484. Id. at 564. 
 485. Id. at 565. 
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solely because they intend to use the information for a constitutionally 
protected purpose.”486 
Stevens’s argument is rejected by the unconstitutional condition 
cases (especially Rust), which suggest that many access restrictions will 
not implicate speech.  Rust and some of its predecessors have engendered 
significant criticism, and in my opinion, rightly so.  Although I believe 
that a number of the unconstitutional conditions cases, including Rust, 
were wrongly decided, many use and access restrictions on personal in-
formation in public records will still pass constitutional muster without 
the aid of these cases. 
Kathleen Sullivan has made one of the most persuasive attacks 
against the unconstitutional condition cases.  As she explains, the Court’s 
approach is to look for when conditions coerce individuals to surrender 
rights or whether such conditions are enacted out of subterfuge and ma-
nipulation.487  This approach, Sullivan argues, is too narrow and crabbed, 
for unconstitutional conditions “can alter the balance of power between 
government and rightholders” and can “skew the distribution of constitu-
tional rights among rightholders because [the government] necessarily 
discriminates facially between those who do and those who do not com-
ply with the condition.”488  Accordingly, Sullivan suggests a broader 
form of analysis for unconstitutional conditions, one that “would subject 
to strict review any government benefit condition whose primary purpose 
or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise of a pre-
ferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by government.”489 
Rust certainly lends support for the theory that government can 
make access to personal information in public records conditional on 
non-disclosure or on particular uses.  Additionally, Rust supports selec-
tive access restrictions.  Rust is a troubling case in my opinion, but I con-
tend that the free speech argument against public record access restric-
tions fails without having to enlist the aid of cases like Rust.  In Rust, the 
government made funding conditional on the expression of a particular 
viewpoint.  This is troublesome, for it is a use of government power (al-
beit in the guise of a carrot rather than a stick) to restrict certain views.  
In contrast, commercial access restrictions are not being applied because 
of disagreement with the message that commercial users wish to send.  
Nor do they favor a particular speaker or specific ideas.  Although par-
ticular categories of use (i.e., commercial) are being singled out, avoiding 
viewpoint discrimination does not entail avoiding all attempts to catego-
 486. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 45 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 487. See Sullivan, supra note 448, at 1413-21. 
 488. Id. at 1490. 
 489. Id. at 1499-1500. 
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rize or limit uses of information.  Indeed, the First Amendment constitu-
tional regime depends upon categorizing speech.  Obscene speech and 
fighting words are not protected,490 false speech about public figures is 
protected in a limited way,491 and commercial speech is protected by in-
termediate scrutiny.  Although there is no bright line that distinguishes 
when certain categories map onto particular viewpoints to such a degree 
as to constitute discrimination based on viewpoint, the category of com-
mercial speech is broad enough to encompass a multitude of viewpoints 
and is a category that forms part of the architecture of the current consti-
tutional regime. 
Therefore, governments should be able to restrict access for certain 
purposes or condition access on an enforceable promise not to engage in 
certain uses of information.  Although the Court has opened a wide door 
to viewpoint discrimination in Rust, a more appropriate approach is to 
curtail broad categories of uses (i.e., commercial, information brokering, 
further disclosure, and so on) rather than narrow categories, which often 
single out particular viewpoints.  Thus, for example, governments should 
not restrict access to public records to those who wish to use the informa-
tion to advocate for certain causes rather than others.  Nor could the gov-
ernment restrict access based on the particular beliefs or ideas of the per-
son or entities seeking access to the information. 
Even if Rust were wrongly decided, we are still not bound to a rigid 
version of neutrality that forces the government into a total access versus 
no access regime.  The issue is whether the government is singling out 
certain uses because of an intent to curtail particular ideas it dislikes.  A 
limitation on commercial use is broad enough to encompass a diverse 
enough range of viewpoints, and the government is merely limiting uses 
of information rather than the expression of particular ideas.492 
 490. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 491. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Curtis Publ’g 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160-61 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296 
(1964).  
 492. Even if the Central Hudson test were to apply, there is a good argument that 
commercial use restrictions would satisfy the test.  It is true that before United Reporting, 
a number of courts struck down access and use restrictions.  However, they did so based 
on their adherence to the secrecy paradigm.  These courts often rejected the state’s asserted 
privacy interest because other uses of information were permitted.  See, e.g., United Re-
porting Publ’g Co. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998),  rev’d L. 
A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Co., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (“The fact that jour-
nalists, academicians, curiosity seekers, and other noncommercial users may peruse and 
report on arrestee records . . . belies the LAPD’s claim that the statute is actually intended 
to protect the privacy interests of arrestees.”);  Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1011 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (“We note that any privacy arguments the state asserts are disingenuous in light 
of the fact that the statute carves out an exception for the media to place any information 
they obtain on the front page of any newspaper in Georgia.”) (citation omitted); Babkes v. 
Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D. Fla. 1996).  According to this argument, if states really 
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CONCLUSION: REGULATING PUBLIC RECORDS   
Public records are increasingly posing a serious threat to privacy in 
the Information Age.  To understand this threat, our conceptions of pri-
vacy must be adapted to today’s technological realities. We must aban-
don the secrecy paradigm and recognize that what is public can be pri-
vate—not in the sense that it is secret, but in that uses and disclosures of 
information can be limited.  Privacy is about degrees of accessibility.  
The threat to privacy is not in isolated pieces of information, but in in-
creased access and aggregation, the construction of digital biographies 
and the uses to which they are put. 
I advocate access and use restrictions on information as well as a 
federal baseline of protection for all public records beyond the limited 
scope of DPPA.  The key issue is whether such a solution would be con-
stitutional.  As long as access and use restrictions are based on a condi-
tional grant of access, they will pass constitutional muster.  Further, the 
Constitution establishes an obligation to protect against disclosure and 
uses of information by the government.  Today, government public re-
cord systems are not meeting this constitutional obligation.  States must 
begin to rethink their public record regimes, and the federal government 
should step in to serve as the most efficient mechanism to achieve this 
goal.  It is time for the public records laws of this country to mature to 
meet the problems of the Information Age. 
 
want to protect privacy, they should also restrict the noncommercial uses of information, 
such as publication of personal information by the media.  This argument is also raised by 
Justice Stevens in dissent in United Reporting: “By allowing such widespread access to the 
information, the State has eviscerated any rational basis for believing that the [statute] will 
truly protect the privacy of these persons.” United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 46 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  As I argued earlier, however, the fact that personal information is disclosed 
selectively does not extinguish one’s privacy interest.  It is the particular uses of informa-
tion that pose some of the greatest problems for privacy.  Even if the information is avail-
able for other purposes, there is an interest in limiting access and uses, especially commer-
cial access given the escalating affront to privacy caused by private sector public record 
aggregation and considering the fact that commercial users do not advance the purpose of 
making such records public in the first place. 
